Spencer Heath's
Series
Spencer Heath Archive
Item 3064
Mises Correspondence – to, from and about Ludwig von Mises. The last 20 pages beginning on page 32, following discussions of Mises’ epistemology, have to do with the nature of science, by Alvin Lowi.
1942-1962
It appears that many of the originals are missing, unless they are located elsewhere in the archive with copies of the individual letters.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Spencer Heath Archive
Item 3064
Carbon of letter from Felix Ehrenhaft on his letterhead but from Heath’s home at Roadsend Gardens, Elkridge, Maryland, introducing Heath to Ludwig von Mises in New York City. Item 2277a is a handwritten letter of a few days later from Ehrenhaft in New York City to Heath.
May 5, 1942
FELIX EHRENHAFT
540 West 57th Street
New York City
My dear Prof. von Mises:
I am writing to you from the beautiful country home of my very dear friend, Spencer Heath, at Elkridge, near Baltimore, Maryland. My wife, whom you have known until lately as Lilly Rona, is here with me and we are visiting here after attending the Baltimore meetings of the American Physical Society at which I have read and presented some papers concerning my researches and discoveries of the magnetic current.
My friend, Mr. Heath, with whom we are staying, I first met in New York some two years ago at a series of meetings and discussions of the philosophy of science. My attention was then drawn to his apparently wide and philosophic understanding of the natural and exact sciences. For a large part of his life, except for a few years in the practice of law, he has been occupied in aeronautical engineering developments and manufactures by his own companies and organizations until a few years ago when he sold out all his properties and patents to a larger company with whom he was engaged for some time as a research engineer before he became fully retired. He therefore has a strong practical point of view, in addition to his capacity for scientific and philosophical thought.
Mr. Heath has been giving much attention to the fundamentals underlying all the natural sciences, with a view to first steps in establishing a science of society upon precisely the same foundations. His ideas in this field seem to be very original, and he has made quite an extensive development of them in a book entitled “The Energy Concept of Population.”
Knowing so well the direction of your own thought in this field, I think it might interest you very much to know something of the kind of work he is doing. He consents to let me send to you with this letter the table of contents and some specimen pages of his present work. If you find this at all interesting I am sure Mr. Heath will feel very honored to let me send you also a copy of his completed manuscript. Please let me hear from you in regard to it.
I am finding much encouragement in the development of my own special work and in gaining the recognition for it that its importance deserves. My wife joins me in sending our very best wishes and high personal regards.
Sincerely yours,
______________________________________________________________________
Spencer Heath Archive
Item 3064
Penned letter to Heath from Felix Ehrenhaft,
340 W. 57th Street, New York City
May 16, 1942
Dear Dr. Heath
Professor Ludwig Mises, N.Y.C. 777 West End Ave, phoned me yesterday. He said to me he was very obliged that I have brought him in touch with you, a person of much qualities.
Prof Mises asked me to send him the book. He would also like to know when you will come to New York. He will be very glad to talk things over then with you. I ask you therefore to get in touch with him directly with reference to me.
Please bring the typewriter if you come to New York. I hope to hear from you very soon.
Mrs. Ehrenhaft and ____________ want to be remembered with kindest regards.
Very truly yours,
/s/ F Ehrenhaft
Excuse my terrible handwriting
_____________________________________________________________________________
Spencer Heath Archive
Item 3064
Carbon of letter from Heath to Felix Ehrenhaft,
540 West 57th Street, New York City, re Von Mises
May 21, 1942
Dear Dr. Ehrenhaft:
So many thanks for all your trouble and interest in getting me in touch with Professor Ludwig von Mises. It was kind of him to telephone to you concerning the letters we sent him and I do hope you have loaned him the full volume and that he is finding it interesting and worthwhile, as I very much believe it to be.
I hope you will pardon my unseemly delay in writing to you and thanking you. I have been in Winchester and Washington and trying to make my arrangements to come to New York very soon. I have been expecting to come before now. That is partly the reason I have not written till now. However, it seems now that I cannot very well come until after the 28th — unless I make a very short trip and return here before that time. I can do that if it seems important to do so.
I am sorry about the typewriter being left behind and hope you have not been greatly in need of it. If you need it very much or very soon please drop me a line or a card and I will have it well packaged up and in the Express Company’s hands the same day I hear from you.
I have had quite a lot of plans for taking my daughter Beatrice with me to New York and also to Canada, but the gasoline situation has been getting worse in Canada as well as here and she has not been able to leave Winchester until after the 23rd. She expects to be back here this weekend or early next week and then we will do something definite.
My very best regards to Mrs. Ehrenhaft and to your good coadjutor, Dr. Banet. I enjoyed having you all here and hope to have you again if you can endure again my very crude accommodations.
I am writing to Prof, von Mises and hope to have the pleasure of meeting him before very long. If you have not done so please let him have the full copy that I loaned to Mrs. Ehrenhaft. I have none other available to send him.
Cordially yours,
______________________________________________________________________
Spencer Heath Archive
Item 3064
Carbon of letter from Heath to Ludwig von Mises,
777 West End Avenue, New York City
May 21, 1942
Dear Prof. von Mises:
I was very much pleased to hear from my good friend Dr. Ehrenhaft that you found the sample pages and table of contents of my “Energy Concept of Population” and asked him to let you look at the entire volume. I hope he has done so and that the complete work has not been a disappointment to you.
I have been thinking and writing along lines that seem to me of very great public importance and with conceptions and points of view that seem to have received very little attention heretofore but which I think ought to be extensively developed much more than I have done so and by persons more capable and in better position for doing it. I have covered so much ground and in such unfamiliar territory I dare say there is much that is crude and inadequate in what I have done, even if accurate. If you have the time and opportunity as well as the interest to read critically I shall certainly appreciate and value highly any comments, constructive or otherwise, that you will be good enough to make. I am not under any urgent necessity of publication. In fact, I would much prefer to have it discussed and criticized in its present easily alterable form by several persons of scholarly standing like yourself before going any further with it.
It was kind of you to suggest to Dr. Ehrenhaft that you would like to talk things over with me. I am sure I shall be delighted to have that opportunity. I expect to be in New York soon but probably not until after the 28th. Please let me know when would be a convenient time to see you.
Very truly yours,
SH/M
Spencer Heath Archive
Item 3064
Penned note from Mises
May 25, 1942
Dear Mr. Heath:
It will be indeed a great pleasure for me to meet the author of the very interesting studies and pamphlets transmitted to me by Prof. Ehrenhaft.
Please call me up when you will be in New York. (Tel. MOnument 2-7877)
Very truly yours,
/s/ L. Mises
_______________________________________________________________
Spencer Heath Archive
Item 3064
Letter from Ludwig von Mises,
777 West End Avenue,
New York 25, NY
No date
Dear Mr. Heath:
On my return from a visit to Europe I found your kind letter of August 22nd and a copy of your new book, Citadel, Market and Altar. Many most sincere thanks!
I am looking forward to the pleasure of studying your new contribution to the science of man and society.
With all good wishes,
Sincerely yours,
/s/ L. Mises
LM/ms
____________________________________________________________________________
Spencer Heath Archive
Item 3064
Carbon of letter to Ludwig von Mises,
777 West End, New York City
April 24, 1945
Dear Professor Von Mises:
Many thanks for sending me the copy of your address. I particularly want to use it in connection with a wealthy philanthropist who is getting a little disturbed about how to do good.
I daresay you are entirely familiar with the digest of Professor Hayek’s book appearing currently in Readers Digest. However, I am sending you a copy of it, since I am distributing them.
I have just finished Isabel Paterson’s “God of the Machine.” She has a strange point of view, or rather a strange manner of expressing it, but she certainly is original and, in politics and economics, truly sound (as you and I understand it). I had the pleasure of meeting her and quite a bit of conversation but that was before I read her book. She has expressed a great deal of interest in some ideas I presented to her and seemed quite eager to read my manuscript, so I have sent it to her.
I am still pressing my manuscript on publishers and editors, but without any definite results so far. I think the principal handicap is in being an unknown writer. It is probably a further handicap that I have approached the whole matter from such a very broad, philosophical point of view.
I am wondering if you might not give me some further assistance by way of suggesting persons more or less remotely connected with publishers and recommending either me or my ideas to them. I think my discovery of the specific function of the institution of property in land, should of itself be something of a recommendation, even without the obvious corollary of extending the contractual technique into the public and governmental services, thus expanding the area of contractual relationships at the expense of coercion and status.
My very best wishes and regards to both of you.
Sincerely,
Spencer Heath
_______________________________________________________________
Spencer Heath Archive
Item 3064
Carbon of letter to Ludwig von Mises, 777 West End Avenue, New York City,
with suggested sample letter recommending Heath to Yale University Press
October 2, 1945
Dear Dr. von Mises:
Mr. Eugene Davidson of the Yale University Press has taken a very favorable interest in my manuscript, CITADEL, MARKET AND ALTAR. He seems desirous of publishing it but feels that before going further it should first be recommended to him, in its political and economic aspects, by a recognized authority in that field such as yourself.
I remember that you were kind enough to say at one time that you would make such a recommendation for whatever assistance it might be to me in obtaining a publisher for the manuscript. Such assistance would be greatly valued and appreciated at the present time.
Remembering your previous commendations, I enclose a brief suggestion as to the kind of letter that would convey the same to Mr. Davidson and would, I believe, be very helpful at this time.
I look forward with pleasure to having you and Mrs. von Mises for my luncheon guests next Thursday at one.
Sincerely yours,
=========================
Mr. Eugene Davidson
Yale University Press
New Haven 7, Conn.
Dear Mr. Davidson:
My friend Spencer Heath tells me that you are considering for publication by the Yale University Press his manuscript entitled, CITADEL, MARKET AND ALTAR.
I want to say to you that I read this manuscript some time ago and have been hoping to see it published under the best of auspices for a manuscript of that kind. It approaches the social situation from a point of view with which I am not familiar, but in its political and economic aspects I regard it as a valuable contribution, not only original but in the long run essentially sound and well deserving of publication by you.
/Penciling:/ Note — At luncheon Dr. von Mises says that Mr. Davidson and Mr. Donaldson of Yale Press will be in New York in a few days and he will then recommend the manuscript to them in person.
_______________________________________________________________
Spencer Heath Archive
Item 3064 /3120/
Letter to Heath at 11 Waverly Place, New York City 3,
from Ludwig von Mises, 777 West End Avenue, New York City 3
September 29, 1953
Dear Mr. Heath:
On my return from a trip to Europe, I found your kind letter of August 21 and your pamphlet “Progress and Poverty Reviewed.” Best thanks.
I am enclosing a pamphlet of mine, “Profit and Loss.” It will show you that I — like you — swallow neither the whole line of communism nor a part of it.
With kindest regards,
Sincerely,
/s/ L. Mises
LVM/rc
_______________________________________________________________
Spencer Heath Archive
Item 3064
Extract from Spencer Heath Archive Item 2010, pages 60-64,
F.A. Harper and George Resch interviewing Heath in his apartment
at 11 Waverly Place, New York 3, NY. Spencer MacCallum also was
present. Words that Heath stressed are italicized. Beginning of
interview and date is lost. Mises’ epistemology pp 10-13
About 1955?
RESCH: “Could you make some remarks about the status of philosophy in our culture?
HEATH: I attended some of their meetings in Harvard in 1938 and ‘39. I know something about the rise of existentialism — I substitute creativism, if I must put anything in opposition to it.
I read extensively among the philosophers in my adolescence, and what I saw then and revolted against, was a worship of the absolute. Like the Bible: you’d read the Bible from cover to cover, and the covers too, or you don’t read any of it. And so you had to have absolute free will, or you didn’t have any free will, at all. You had to have absolute self-determination, you had to have absolute this and that and the other, everything was in absolutes and infinitudes. And they were wallowing around about how you could reconcile these absolutes and infinitudes — none of which could ever come into human experience. So philosophy was cursed with what I called the absolutism, as politics is cursed by the same thing, /chuckling/ called absolutism. And they had to be outgrown. Well we outgrew it through what they call, in this country, pragmatism, and utilitarianism in England, and things like that, a good deal of the blind leading the blind and never coming out any place. A good deal like Omar Khayyám when he says, “In my youth I did frequent doctor and saint and heard much argument, but ever and anon came out the door wherein I went.” /chuckling/ Well these people were always coming out the door wherein they went.
Now then came along the psychological approach a whole lot, bringing so much psychology into philosophy, and the result of all this is something that I mentioned at the table. They were using ideas to play with ideas. And that gets them nowhere, either; it just leads them in blind alleys, all around and around and around, a merry-go-round, and so they’re stalemated in midseas in a kind of a Sargasso Sea in doldrums. They may be turning around a lot, but not getting anywhere.
Now we are coming upon the time when the physical scientists are beginning to realize that philosophy is their meat too, and they’re making some more or less crude attempts to break into that field. I don’t need to tell you the people, perhaps Schroedinger and Whitehead, and Count deBroglie in France, and so on. And in doing this, they’re taking their metaphysical conceptions, like mathematical and geometrical conceptions, which are purely idealistic and don’t have any more than an analogical relationship to physical events, and they are trying to start with hypotheses, like Von Mises.
I want to say, in all friendliness, that if I had any dispute with Von Mises, it would not be upon any practical grounds, but upon the origin of his ideas. His ideas appear, as he expresses them himself in his introductory works and so on — I never had time to read his ponderous volumes — that he has a theory which is divine or perfect somehow, and that he has to find in the economic system facts that are in accordance with that theory, and we have to act in that manner because that is the manner prescribed by the theory. He seems to take that stand, in the same way that Heisenberg takes the uncertainty principle as a point of departure to argue from. Now I couldn’t find out where Von Mises got his theory from. It looks as though he got it either from Olympus or Mount Sinai, or right out of the horse’s mouth, so to speak. /chuckle/ But wherever he got it from, that’s his point of departure. Luckily, he has a theory that is sound — it corresponds with Adam Smith and with other constructive thinkers — and so I’m all for Von Mises. But on the philosophic foundation, I’m off of him.
I mention this as an illustration of the road that philosophy and science both have taken in this second quarter of the 20th century. They’ve both gone metaphysical. They’ve departed out of this world, and they’re looking at pie-in-the-sky-by-and-by and playing pretty games with it. They’re not basing their conclusions on anything that originates in experience. They’re basing their conclusions upon things that they imagine, without having any inductive basis for so imagining. Therefore they’re conceiving of nothing as space and giving it shapes like doughnuts and saddles and things like that, /chuckling/ and all the time putting up the fundamental formulas that this and that equals zero — as though a zero being equal to zero was a too foolish thing for anybody to entertain. /chuckling/
RESCH: “You’re referring largely, I take it, to Mises’ basic epistemology, which is neo-Kantian, I believe. So far as his political philosophy goes, disregarding the specific content of it, there’s no doubt that David Hume and Bentham are his heroes, and that he’s completely Utilitarian. I wonder if you’d care to comment on this; I’m not a connoisseur.”
HEATH: I’m not enough versed to be sure about that, but I’m inclined to take that view as you are expressing it now, very much so. Very much so.
Have I said enough about the philosophy? We’re wandering in the wilderness of metaphysics, both in science and philosophy today. And that’s a very bad wilderness. Luckily, Von Mises has found sound principles there, whether he got them from God or from Olympus or Mount Sinai, I don’t know, but he’s got perfectly good, sound principles there.
For my part, I’m analytical. I begin from the ground up, take bit by bit the simplest manifestations of nature — of the mind of God in the works of God — and build up, up, and up. Von Mises is something like the Irishman who criticized the mason who was building a chimney. You know, Irishmen are kind of metaphysical anyhow. He said, “What do ye want to be diggin’ all that big hole in the ground fer, an’ burying all them bricks down there? Don’t ye know where ye want the top of the chimney to be? And if ye do, can’t ye put a brick up there? And if it doesn’t stay, put another’n under it to hold it up?”
MACCALLUM: “Wonderful. But, Popdaddy, isn’t that what you’ve been doing? Didn’t you get your proprietary principle first, a priori, and then work down to the ground from it?”
HEATH: /chuckling/ Did I?
MACCALLUM: “Didn’t you?”
HEATH: I thought I got it from experience — observation, that is, experience of others observing it — and I got it partly from Henry George’s suggestion of what would happen if the services were performed by somebody. It would raise the values in land. Well, the people who are going to get that value should perform the services, naturally. That wasn’t any theory, it was an observation.
HARPER: “The question raised about Mises in relation to utilitarianism may be important. One extremely competent observer has recently pointed out that for some reason, practically every one of the older students of Mises have defected from his strictly libertarian economics and become semi-socialists. He went over the list of the European students of Von Mises. The interesting question here is why did that happen? It may be very fundamental here. You raised a question, you see, about his philosophical base. It’s just barely possible that the structure you build on it without a solid philosophical base may be a brick suspended in mid-air that may happen to look all right there at the moment, but will fall the first time it meets a challenge of a practical problem, and the fellow comes out a Keynesian economist.”
Heath: Well I hadn’t heard about that. I’m sorry to hear it if it’s true. But I would like to give less credit to Von Mises. As Beethoven and as great creators in the world have intuited something, and then found out that their intuitions were sound, we’ve gotten great gifts of knowledge and understanding of nature from that. Now, I’d like to think that Von Mises has had a sound intuition, and got his proper theories in that way, and if he did, I am perfectly well satisfied . . not as well either; I think I’d prefer the method of getting it from the ground up, building it up bit by bit, from the ground.
HARPER: “See, that may be adequate to find an answer to a problem. This other problem relates to the training of another mind; this intuitive origin does not hold for the second person.”
HEATH: It’s not so reliable; it can’t be demonstrated to anybody else. The man who composes the Ninth Symphony can’t tell anybody how he did it; he doesn’t understand, himself, how he did it.
RESCH: “At one conference, there was an exchange between a professor and Prof. Mises, in which the other professor challenged Mises, saying that, ‘According to your belief, if I were to show you that socialism would produce more goods than the market economy, you would have to be a socialist.’ And Mises said, ‘Yes, that is correct. When you can show me that the socialist or communist organization of society results in more goods, then I’ll be in favor of that.’ To my knowledge, that is a position that he retains to this day. To that extent, I think utilitarianism in this context becomes an issue and something of a problem.”
HEATH: If somebody would say, “If prison labor produces more shoes than the free labor does, you believe in prison labor.
HARPER: “That’s it. That’s where that does bring you out. Because the test he has put is not the test of the right of a free man, but is the test of the pile of potatoes that’s being produced.”
HEATH: Yes, well that’s Henry George over again: products of labor applied to land is all there is to consider in economics.
RESCH: “Culturally, it ends up with materialistic considerations.
HEATH: I’ve got to have the spiritual considerations. A man has got to be a creator, to suit me. Whether he creates much or little, he’d better create one ounce than to be a . . .
RESCH: “There’s more creativeness in a free dolt than in a working slave, I expect.
HEATH: I should say so. Besides . . there’s no end of philosophic argument against slavery, slave conditions, and so on.
________________________________________________________________
Spencer Heath Archive
Item 3064
Carbon of letter of October 24, 1956, to Mr. and Mrs. Ludwig von Mises, 777 West End Avenue, New York City, followed by Mises’ penned response of
October 30, 1956
Dear Friends,
I have been away from New York all summer and, in fact, most of the time since I had the pleasure of seeing both or either of you. It was kind of you to attend the little affair at the Matchette Foundation in compliment to me, and I was happy to be present at the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of Dr. Mises’ doctorate and his long service in the cause of freedom.
I am spending more time now at my home here in Maryland than for some time past, but will be in New York in a day or so, to remain until the fifteenth of November at my old address there, 11 Waverly Place.
Perhaps I will be seeing you at the Alliance Meeting on Next Tuesday, the 30th. I surely want to hear Dean Manion speak, and shall be very happy to see you if you attend, and the more so if I may have you as my guests at the coffee hour following the meeting.
With all best wishes,
Cordially,
SH/m
_____________________________
Spencer Heath Archive
Item 3064
Penned note to Heath from Ludwig von Mises
October 30, 1956
Dear Mr. Heath:
I am sorry I had a previous engagement /which/ prevents me from attending the Alliance meeting and thus deprives me of the pleasure of joining you.
It was good to hear from you again.
With all good wishes,
Cordially,
/s/ L. Mises
_____________________________________________________________________
Spencer Heath Archive
Item 3064
Printed invitation to a function in New York with penned notation by Spencer MacCallum: “Popdaddy’s coming up for the day by train to attend this. I’m pressing his tux at the cleaner’s. Save this for the file.” Guest list follows on separate page.
March 7, 1956
|
|
You are cordially invited to
share in the presentation of
ON FREEDOM AND FREE ENTERPRISE
a volume of essays expressly prepared
to honor the fiftieth anniversary of
the doctorate of
LUDWIG VON MISES
at dinner on
Wednesday, the seventh of March
Nineteen hundred and fifty-six
at seven o’clock
Friedrich August von Hayek
will speak
University Club
Fifty-fourth Street at Fifth Avenue
New York
RESERVATION CARD ENCLOSED
DINNER JACKET OPTIONAL
Guest List
Ludwig von Mises Dinner
University Club, New York
March 7, 1956
|
|
Chester I. Barnard, New York City
Alberto Benegas Lynch, Washington, D. C.
W. A. Berridge, New York City
Miss Bettina Bien, Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.
Ivan R. Bierly, Mt. Kisco, N. Y.
Henry M. Boettinger, New York City
Wm. F. Buckley, Jr., New York City
Lowell R. Burch, New York City
John R. Chamberlain, Cheshire, Conn.
Frank Chodorov, Berkeley Heights, N.J.
G. Rowland Collins, New York City
Richard C. Cornuelle, Burlingame, Calif.
Philip Cortney, New York City
Jasper E. Crane, Wilmington, Delaware
Miss Vernelia Crawford, Tarrytown, N.Y.
W. M. Curtiss, Chappaqua, N.Y.
Arthur O. Dahlberg, New York City
John Davenport, New York City
Eugene Davidson, New Haven, Conn.
Adolph M. Dettloff, New York City
Frank T. Dierson, New York City
John Farrell, Plymouth, Massachusetts
Lawrence Fertig, New York City
Mrs. Lawrence Fertig
William C. Flaherty, Detroit, Mich.
Arthur Goddard, New York City
Pierre F. Goodrich, Indianapolis, Ind.
Charles A. Greeff, New York City
F. A. Harper, Chappaqua, N.Y.
F. A. Hayek, Chicago, Illinois
Henry Hazlitt, New York City
Mrs. Henry Hazlitt
Spencer Heath, New York City
Ronald S. Hertz, Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y.
Robert A. Hessen, New York City
Isidor Hodes, New York City
W. J. Holman, Jr., New York City
Miss Vada Horsch, New York City
Malcolm Johnson, Princeton, N. J.
A. Ranney Johnson, Irvington, N.Y.
Mrs. A. Ranney Johnson
Hugh P. King, Vienna, Virginia
Willf ord I. King, Douglaston, N.Y. George Koether, Pelham, N.Y.
C. Wesley LaBlanc, Jr., New York City Leonard P. Liggio, New York City
John McCarty, New York City
John W. McDermott, New York City
Glenn McHugh, New York City
Fritz Machlup, Baltimore, Maryland
J. B. Matthews, New York City
Mrs. J. B. Matthews
Victor Milione, Philadelphia, Pa.
Loren B. Miller, Detroit, Michigan
Spencer Miller, Jr., New York City
Ben Moreell, Pittsburgh, Pa.
Oskar Morgenstern, Princeton, N.J.
G. Warren Nutter, North Haven, Conn.
Frederick Nymeyer, South Holland, Ill.
Paul H. Nystrom, New York City
Edmund A. Opitz, White Plains, N.Y.
Wm. H. Peterson, Short Hills, N.J.
Mrs. Wm. H. Peterson
Sylvester Petro, New Rochelle, N. Y.
Paul L. Poirot, Ossining, N.Y.
J. H. Price, Bronxville, N.Y.
Leonard E. Read, Irvington, N. Y.
Anthony Reinach, New York City
George Reisman, New York City
Ellsworth G. Reynolds, New York City
Charles S. Roberts, New York City
Claude Robinson, Princeton, N.J.
John R. Rohrs, New York City
S. Edward Ronk, Wilbraham, Mass.
Murray Rothbard, New York City
Mrs. Murray Rothbard
(over
P. Dean Russell, Elmsford, N.Y.
Noel Sargent, Garden City, N.Y.
F. J. Schlink, Washington, N. J.
Mrs. F. J. Schlink
Alfred Schutz, New York City
Jack Schwartzman, New York City
Dean H. Secord, New Haven, Conn.
Hans Sennholz, Tarrytown, N.Y.
Mrs. Hans Sennholz
Thomas J. Shelly, Scarsdale, N.Y.
Chads O. Skinner, New York City
Louis M. Spadaro, New York City
Walter E. Spahr, New York City
Frank H. Sparks, Crawfordsville, Ind.
Ludwig von Mises, New York City
Mrs. Ludwig von Mises
Robert H. W. Welch, Jr., Cambridge, MA.
Ray B. Westerfield, New Haven, Conn.
Albert C. Wilcox, New York City
Charles H. Wolfe, Tarrytown, N.Y.
______________________________________________________________
Spencer Heath Archive
Item 3064
Letter to Dr. F. A. Harper
November 29, 1956
Dear Dr. Harper:
I think it is just too bad that our friend, Henry Hazlitt, had to dredge up out of von Mises his negative assertion that there is no measurement or unit of measurement in the field of human action. What makes society rational in the same sense that inanimate nature is rational is the employment of units to measure the human energy or action that flows freely among the members of an economic society.
If there were no measuring, there could be no accountancy and no rational means of determining how the members stand with respect to their obligations one to another. Without the rationality of the market, all transfers of human action would be regulated by the emotions, positive or negative, precisely as in the case of animals or biological and pre-social organization — love and self-sacrifice on the one hand, dog-eat-dog on the other.
I think your questions are very much to the point. All things in nature are quantitative. They are also qualitative, positively or negatively so, according as they serve or retard the advancement of life in its highest forms.
Anyhow, no negative statement about anything can be positively proved. I think Mr. Hazlitt’s animadversions against mathematical economics, as commonly applied, are in the main well taken, but that he recoiled against it too strongly to keep on an even keel.
Cordially,
________________________________________________________________________
Spencer Heath Archive
Item 3064
Letter from F.A. Harper to Heath re Mises and Hazlitt’s epistemology,
The Foundation for Economic Education, Irvington-on-Hudson, New York
December 10, 1956
Dear Mr. Heath:
Thank you for sending a copy of Schroedinger’s “What is Life?”, which I await in anticipation because of your recommendation.
In your letter about the Hazlitt item, I like your reference to the obligation aspect of human relationships. In all exchange, and all other contractual arrangements such as credit and the like, one should wonder how they can be carried out in the absence of quantitative expression. And if they are expressible quantitatively, they are for sure reducible to measurement.
And your comment that “no negative statement about anything can be positively proved” brings to mind an observation made one day by my economics professor — himself quite a fine logician. He said that the only way to prove that water babies do not exist is to find some water babies nonexisting.
The best,
Cordially,
/s/ F.A. Harper
_______________________________________________________________
Spencer Heath Archive
Item 3064
Carbon of a letter to Josef Solterer,
Department of Economics,
Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.
July 22, 1957
Dear Dr. Solterer:
Having now carefully read — and re-read — your excellent review of Dr. von Mises’ Human Action as it appeared in The Review of Social Economy for September, 1950, I find myself much disposed towards the same general point of view. However, it does prompt some further and perhaps pertinent observations.
The phenomenon of economics, as a specific system of interrelated events, is necessarily an abstraction based on some basic similarity among the events of which the system is composed. The abstraction may be strict and severe, taking into account only a single and ever-present character of the events involved, or it may be less rigid, admitting of some less constant, occasional or unessential characteristics, in which latter case the more rigid generalization may seem less valid and a poorer guide to understanding.
The difference may lie mainly in the degree that one or another follows the Platonic maxim, “He shall be as a god to me who can rightfully define and divide.” It seems to me that in his explication of the Market phenomenon, Dr. von Mises is the more rigorous in his definition of it, hence seemingly, if not actually, more dogmatic than seems allowable to one whose definition is, in effect, a wider premise. Noting your reference to three aspects of an economic event, it may be that Dr. von Mises keeps his eye single to distribution because this is the constant culmination towards which negotiation and management are only contributory as means rather than ends. That this does not include ethical considerations is, of course, no denial of their value and importance in circumstances where a numerical and thereby quantitative rationality, such as the arithmetic of the market, is not present or but little prevails. If, as many believe, there is a truly rational and mathematical, dependable order in the strictly contractual processes of the free market, such as there is in purely mechanical or chemical processes, then it must be as futile to look for an ethical element in the one as in the other. It may even be that the divine in our cosmos is ever leading gradually towards rational relationships of abstract beauty and proportion, with diminishing dependence on ethical motivation or restraint. If ethics may be regarded as countervailing disorder, its field of operation must necessarily diminish where a purely rational and automatic order increasingly prevails.
The strictly market phenomenon, with its system of numerical accountancy, is, when sharply defined, perhaps the only area of human action that has developed a strictly numerical rationality in the actions and inter-actions among men. It thus has a degree at least of the certainty and dependability characteristic of natural law in other and simpler realms — laws that are divine in that they stand ever ready to serve creative ends and ideals, so only that these laws be learned and obeyed. We should, perhaps, remind ourselves that the high rationality of the natural laws is truly serviceable, and that it manifests the divine no less than do the ethical disciplines and monitions that may go far to mitigate in particular circumstances the effects of the relative disorder that continues to prevail over wide areas of human relationships — particularly in the administration of public affairs.
The foregoing tends largely to justify Dr. von Mises’ extreme preoccupation with the rationality of the market — of purely contractual exchange — and, indirectly, the severity of his strictures on the contrasting political and essentially coercive procedures which, in their completeness, constitute the totalitarian state. It does not, however, justify the “arrogance” with which he seems to dismiss the importance of ethical and esthetic motivations apart from exchange as determinants in the realm of “human action.”
Like the “natural” sciences, the economic science of the schools, whether of the “right” or of the “left,” is based almost wholly upon materialistic conceptions. The service of bodily needs and enjoyments has been their almost exclusive concern, as if this were itself an end instead of only the foundation, the necessary condition and means toward a spiritual life of creativity in the free realms of intellect and spontaneous art. And, as in any merely practical science, it is not preoccupation with the rationality of its subject-matter that is to be deplored, but the treating of some given quantity of knowledge as though fixed, final and complete, and the oft times arrogant denial that anything above or beyond can exist.
Your review gratifyingly separates the wheat from the chaff. It is generous in praise of what it accepts, and reasonably restrained in what it rejects. It “rightly defines and divides.”
Sincerely yours,
SH/m
P.S. My paper, “The Practice of Christian Freedom,” was particularly well received at the Annual Meeting of The Christian Freedom Foundation. I therefore take pleasure in sending a copy of it to you, believing it will be congenial to your feelings and general point of view.
_______________________________________________________________
Spencer Heath Archive
Item 3064
Telegram from Mises, New York City, to Heath
at 312 Halesworth, Santa Ana, California
January 2, 1960
Wishing you the happiest birthday you ever had and many still happier returns.
Margit and Ludwig von Mises
____________________________________________________________
Spencer Heath Archive
Item 3064
Extract from carbon of letter to F.A. Harper
September 10, 1960
I was much interested some time ago in an enclosure from you … criticizing our excellent friend, von Mises, for some of his theoretical shortcomings perhaps. The authorship was not given, but I think it might easily have been Bob LeFevre. The criticism seemed on the face of it well taken, even if not of immediate practical importance. This matter of absolutes and relatives is highly illuminated, historically at least, by Ernst Cassirer. But his conclusions, if any, I have not read him far enough to evaluate. In the case of von Mises, I think we should have too much gratitude and appreciation for his influence on behalf of liberty in general, without being too critical of his ulterior philosophic abstractions — however much we may like to delve into these matters among ourselves. (What I have just written has been without convenient reference to the memorandum you sent.)
_______________________________________________________________
Spencer Heath Archive
Item 3064
Pencil notes for a letter to F. A. Harper re Mises
December 1960?
Dear Baldy
Anent (belatedly) your note to Spencer and me carrying a criticism of Von Mises’ relativistic ethics, I have not read the particular Mises “paper” to which this criticism is addressed by, as I suspect, our fine friend, Bob LeFevre, but its points seem to me well made. For von Mises, like most of us, has no ultimate criterion or unassailable guiding star by which to set the course of ideal human action, no final standard by which to guide it towards the good — and thereby away from evil. I think he is too little of a Benthamite to take happiness, either as freedom from pain or as gratification of mere animal needs and desires, for the final human So he accepts the idea that there needs to be an ethic, a morality, a negative discipline for suppression of the primordial depravity (original sin) which is the heritage of the mere animal nature in man and against which all kinship groups at least set sanctions arbitrary and more or less condign. Von Mises doubtless sees this in all its manifold variety according to circumstance and environment, with no uniformity to bespeak any unchanging absolute at its core. So, for want of any recognition of the creative capacity, the spiritual nature of socially and thus voluntarily functioning mankind he accepts this relativistic ethics as the only recourse of socially functioning and thus regenerate men.
All men are finite and relative to their environment and one to another. Hence there can be no absolute behavior (or government) among them. But they can have an absolute even though not completely attainable ideal, not as a chosen end or goal but as a progressive guide towards ever widening dreams, more real, and thus more enduring, goals.
Man, in his animal nature has no immortal dream, but the regenerate man, the creative and thereby spiritual man aspires to and in free and reciprocal relations with his fellow man aspires to and moves onward towards a higher and ever more abundant life and length of days as dreamed of old.
Thus life itself, creative, advancing and immortal life is the absolute ideal, never to be fully attained in our relative interdependence but always to give direction towards ever more enduring
________________________________________________________
Spencer Heath Archive
Item 3064
Penned notes for a letter to F. A. Harper
December 1960?
Dear Baldy –
I have kept up poorly my acknowledgments of your various remembrances and enclosures.
The one by an unknown critic (Bob LeFevre, I suspect) concerning the “relative ethics” of our great friend, Von Mises, is interesting indeed. The critic, I am glad to say, does not gainsay the competence and value of Von Mises in his own special field of economics, but only in the field of moral standards where he is under the widely prevailing handicap /of/ a blind empiricism — whatever is, the custom, in my /any?/ time or place is right. The vice of moral (mores) point of view is
/Evidently page missing/
…their uniquely human and spiritual potentials their common and united motivation is mutual and proceeds from within instead of being compelled from without. It liberates men physically and thereby metaphysically, giving them facility to gratify their non-conflicting needs and desires and the freedom from coercion by another whereby, without conflict and in mutual aid, to pursue the inspiration of their dreams. On this level gradually attained the motivation towards good conduct instead of moral, based on fear, becomes esthetic, based on a feeling for things conceived as beautiful, of loveliness dreamed and desired.
Not to ward off deficiencies and disabilities, whether of body or of mind, but to reach out serenely towards ever unattainable ideals as the mariner is guided by his heavenly stars.
The test of virtue (vitality and strength) in any act is not in the customs that prevail at any time or place but this: Does it serve life? And here the esthetic motivation is supreme both for the individual and for the whole. A commonplace prudence, even fear, may save the drab life merely of being, but the life of becoming is saved only by the free outreachings of the spirit towards its ideals.
To be more specific: The criterion for any precept or code of …
To take mere custom as the criterion of any code or precept as Von Mises seems to do, leaves one with no standard at all…./leaves/ one bogged in the indeterminate relativism of which the critic complains and may well deplore.
____________________________________________________________
Spencer Heath Archive
Item 3064
Carbon of letter from Heath to Ludwig von Mises,
777 West End Avenue, New York, New York
October 18, 1961
Dear Dr. von Mises:
It was wonderful to be present last night and hear the many beautiful tributes that were laid at your feet.
During my last two years in Southern California, I have encountered many libertarian friends who have been rather more open than elsewhere to new and advancing conceptions in the realm of spirit and mind. As a reminder of these, there has just come to my hand a clipping from the Santa Ana Register of October 15, 1961. This article concerns the work of our recently found friend, Joseph A. Galambos.
Thinking you may find this of considerable interest, 1 am sending it to you with my very best wishes.
Again wishing both you and Margit many more honors and happy returns,
Sincerely yours,
Encl.
_____________________________________________________________
Spencer Heath Archive
Item 3064
Carbon of letter from Heath, Apt. 11-C, 11 Waverly Place, New York 3,
New York, to Ludwig von Mises, 777 West End Avenue, New York, New York
October 26, 1961
Dear Dr. von Mises:
It was nice talking with you on the telephone today, and I am looking forward to hearing further from you.
Referring to the newspaper article about the work of our friend, Joseph A. Galambos, in California, I am sending you another article from Mr. Hoiles’ paper which I have just received (all marked up by the friend who sent it), thinking it may also be of interest to you.
I have had some extensive discussions with Mr. Galambos and am favorably impressed with him, particularly on account of his very great admiration for you and your writings which he has frequently expressed. I hope you will enjoy this further information about him. I know he would appreciate any comment you might send him regarding his work.
Cordially yours,
SH/m
____________________________________________________________________________
Spencer Heath Archive
Item 3064
Extract from Item 2037
Pages 16-18 of 2037, taped conversation
Between Heath and Alvin Lowi, Jr.
January 7, 1962
HEATH: I don’t like to think of a free enterprise system that has been built, it’s finished, and all we’ve got to do is to keep repeating it. It’s on the march; it’s going places it’s never been.
LOWI: Oh I’m in complete sympathy with this point of view.
HEATH: And I’m fascinated with the indications of what its future possibilities are — beyond what it has already accomplished.
LOWI: It’s of concern to some of my associates that my personal interest sometimes, that is, my interest in the ultimate consequences and the ultimate questions that would occur whenever we had no more worries about constructing a proper society, but after we had one what would . . .
HEATH: If you got it on a good working basis.
LOWI: Yes, after we had constructed the so-called moral society, then, ask myself questions and try to answer them in that perspective.
HEATH: After you’ve got the automobile so it would run, then where do you want to go with it? (laughing)
LOWI: Yes. Some of my colleagues get a little impatient because maybe I don’t devote enough of my energies to the immediate problem at hand of constructing this moral society in the first place.
HEATH: They’re not as imaginative as you are.
LOWI: Well, I wouldn’t say that; I think that it’s a matter of priorities. I can’t stop living, but I agree with them that this is more urgent. Nevertheless, as a matter of personal satisfaction, I would prefer thinking about these things.
HEATH: I think that unless we do that . . . If we think of economics in a pedestrian sort of a way — free-enterprise economics — as a thing that has been achieved, accomplished, but is working under difficult conditions owing to the impact of government upon it, and that our dream is that we could get the government off its back so it wouldn’t be bothered with the
government any more, that is very pedestrian to me. Uninspiring.
LOWI: I think we’ve merely started. I think that, first of all, we haven’t even established — that is, established in the strict sense — a proper social science. So how can we say that we know everything we want to know about social organization and human action — interactions of human beings and groups of human beings? I don’t think we’ve scratched. You’re the first person I’ve met who I could truly say had given it a proper view, who had looked at the characteristics of such a society . . .
HEATH: As something that has been developing and is going somewhere?
LOWI: . . . with a view to explaining how things would work when a society was constructed as it ought to be. Like Von Mises, for example, stops at the point where he’s described the main features of a free market system — and in terms of such devices as gold money which we have known before and we know that it worked satisfactorily.
HEATH: The same as barter did.
LOWI: Yes. But von Mises never asks himself the question, is there something better? The trouble with that maybe is that some people will construe from such a question that von Mises may not be perfectly certain about what he’s talking about, if he asks himself that question. To me, it’s . . I know, for example, that von Mises’ ideas of the market economy are right, as far as they go . .
HEATH: I agree with that, too.
LOWI: . . and that a proper social science, after generations, will not repudiate the basic tenets of Von Mises’ ideas. But Von Mises’ ideas are not complete, and what will happen is the same sort of thing that happened when Einstein verified his relativity with respect to Newton’s mechanics. It did not repeal Newton’s mechanics at all. It did not change the basic usefulness of Newtonian mechanics. But what it did do, is it placed limits on its validity and showed how it was a special case of a more general mechanics. I think the same thing could be said of what we now call classical economics.
HEATH: We may say that because we have very much better steam engines nowadays, we don’t want to discredit James Watts.
LOWI: Well of course not, and who wants to discredit James Watt? He was first.
HEATH: We don’t want to discredit von Mises . . .
LOWI: No.
HEATH: . . . even though we see that there’s a great deal to be accomplished yet.
LOWI: Yes. Von Mises, from my own contact with him, is very difficult to talk to /with/ about such questions. If you ask a question about money, his first reaction is a suspicion of your being what he calls, a “monetary quack” — or a “monetary crank,” I forget which term he used. But he is more or less unwilling to discuss concepts in terms other than those which he is accustomed to using.
HEATH: He’s quite dogmatic. He’s got it laid down — in the proper words, proper thoughts, properly expressed! (laughing)
LOWI: In a limited way. Not nearly so much as Ayn Rand though, I’ve found.
HEATH: No.
LOWI: Von Mises is easy to talk to in some respects, compared to Ayn Rand.
HEATH: I tried to talk to her a little bit — oh, back about in the, somewhere in the early thirties, I guess it was.
LOWI: Really? Have you known her since then?
HEATH: Well I didn’t know her but very briefly then — casually — and I’ve never seen her but once or twice since. Rather recently. I never had any . . .
LOWI: Was she that way then?
HEATH: Well I couldn’t say so definitely, I didn’t know her well enough. But I would infer that. She wasn’t a person who would discuss the merits of anything. She had her mind made up.
LOWI: Well in some respects I have my mind made up too, and so do you. But this doesn’t mean that I can’t entertain a radically different view of things ..
HEATH: That’s it.
LOWI: . . . simply because, I’m confident that I understand what I’m talking about, and I have no fear that somebody else is going to confuse me. At least, I have enough confidence in myself to think that I’ll be able to judge a new idea. If I ever lose this, I think I’ll . . .
HEATH: If there’s anything in this new idea, well then you might gain! (laughing)
LOWI: Oh of course! I want to expose myself to all kinds of ideas.
HEATH: And if it isn’t a sound idea, I’m well enough established not to be knocked down by it. (laughing)
_______________________________________________________________
Spencer Heath Archive
Item 3064
Article by Alvin Lowi on Galambos’ program of freedom
April, 2008
SCIENCE VERSUS IDEOLOGY
Alvin Lowi, Jr.
April 11, 1998
Revised April, 2008
BACKGROUND
Andrew Joseph Galambos, founder of the Free Enterprise Institute (FEI) and The Liberal, Inc., is credited with the formulation of both a scientific and an ideological approach to advancing human freedom. He realized that significant social progress would require substantial change in public attitudes regarding politics and government, which, in turn, would require the successful propagation of an appropriate ideology or system of beliefs. But Galambos was aware that an appropriate ideology required solid scientific support to remain relevant to purpose in actuality.
It was on this basis that Galambos originally ventured to develop a university, ultimately to be known as the Liberal Institute of Natural Science and Technology (“LIONS Tech”). This was the vision that brought him his initial following (circa 1960) including this writer. Subsequently, he established FEI for the purpose of presenting assorted lecture courses to the public. The curriculum would be comprised primarily of courses of his own design and content, but complementary ones would be offered on occasion by notable free-market scholars and philosophers by invitation. FEI courses were designed primarily for lay adults having no specific preparation or prerequisites other than intellectual honesty. It was significant that the first 13-week course he offered was titled “Capitalism, the Key to Survival.”
Galambos believed an authentic social science was essential for making any real progress toward a more autonomous (“free”) society because science is the only known antidote for dogma, fantasy and superstition, human foibles that interfere with dealing with the world and life as it actually is, not as it “ought” to be. He taught science as the only check there is on arbitrary opinion.[1] Moreover, he treated social advancement as a technological development based on a dependable social technology that derived from an authentic social science. The science was prerequisite.
Since predispositions of thought are the main obstacles to ideological enlightenment, which is the precursor to advancements in the art of social living, Galambos proposed a “Science of Volition” that could provide the theoretical foundation for his ideology of freedom, which he called “twenty-first-century liberalism.” Although he was mindful that the term “liberalism” had become a synonym for political conquest and socialism, he insisted on using that the term as an appropriate label for his ideological program because it was traceable to its original nineteenth-century European meaning, which was individual liberty.[2] He also claimed to have formulated the applicable science based on a unique set of postulates consistent with the American Revolution.[3]
Galambos’ recognized at the outset that as a social movement, his ideological program for “liberalism” (meaning laissez faire capitalism) owned a superficial resemblance to Karl Marx’s campaign for “scientific socialism” launched over 100 years earlier when these ideological labels were sharply differentiated in the public mind.[iv] However, Galambos, the professor of astrophysics and consultant to the aerospace industry, had an advantage over Marx, the unemployed lawyer and rabble-rouser. When it came to science, Galambos knew whereof he spoke. He was mindful of a fact of nature that the means employed for whatever purpose must be consistent with the ends sought and that both must conform to the dictates of nature as best they can be comprehended. He was under no illusions that nature could be second-guessed or subjected to conquest no matter the public clamor for such.
GALAMBOS VERSUS MARX
Curiously, both Marx and Galambos were innovators who claimed their approaches to the exposition of human social life were scientifically justified and that their wholly opposite means would attain precisely identical social ends, namely human freedom. The question immediately arises as to which of these starkly contrasting ideologies is the more authentic and realistic in the long run?
Until the relatively recent demise of the 75 year old Soviet Socialist Empire, few would have embraced Galambos’ views over Marx’s. Yet, Galambos had impeccable scientific credentials as well as solid evidence for advancing his hypotheses. Marx had none, but he made up for his deficiencies with ample fancy and chutzpah. [v] Apparently, when it came to public promotion, Marx’s appeal to vanity gave him a short-term advantage. The longer term consequences would not become apparent to scientific observation for over a generation. Even then, life would afford only so much leisure.
Fundamentally, Galambos believed that the best humans could attain in the world would be harmonious accommodation with the nature of the world as it is, which is to be obtained only through scientific understanding. Accordingly, after a brief flirtation with the “Goldwater-for-President” movement at the Republican National Convention in 1960, he abandoned political participation of any kind, concentrating on the purely social phenomena that endure from generation to generation without conflict.
By contrast, Karl Marx postulated the existence of social classes in perpetual conflict that would remain so until all the classes were forcefully merged into a uniform class of survivors, the most numerous class, which he labeled the “proletariat.”* Marx’s “science” established that this result could only be accomplished by force since the privileges and wealth characterizing the minority privileged “classes” would never abandon their privileges voluntarily. Marx also understood that the most numerous class could be incited to riot over envy of the more wealthy, a battle they would win by sheer force of numbers. Accordingly, he developed and promoted an ideological program of political action to foment and intensify “class” conflict as a prelude to the expropriation of the “bourgeoisie” (middle class, merchants or business people) and forceful regimentation of the “proletariat” (“lower-class” laborers or wage-earners).[vi] Marx thus advocated “class” warfare where the classes were arbitrary or statistical demographic artifacts constructed to purpose. His program had ideological appeal because the vast majority were inclined to envy the few holders of wealth and could be enticed to encroach once convinced of the right.
Marx had no familiarity with science as that endeavor had come to be known from the works of the likes of Galileo and Newton. His expertise was superficial at best and strictly rhetorical. He was a scientist in name only, the term “science” having been introduced into the English language as recently as 1833 by William Whewell.[vii]
Nevertheless, Marx’s approach was highly relevant to and opportunistic for the attainment of political ends, as the modern history of national governments will attest. In that sense, Marx could be considered a political scientist with at least as much of a claim to the title as Nicolo Machiavelli, who’s ______ is indubitable. We are here defining political science as the science of human conquest by humans.
Marx’s stated political objective was to create a classless society by what he claimed to be scientific means. Although his claims to social science were purely rhetorical, his political science was realistic insofar as he was offering expeditious and opportunistic means to attain the ends he sought. His approach was totally collectivistic and coercive yet appealing to base human emotions, showing those more vicious than he how to exploit peoples’ susceptibility to greed, envy and vanity. Since Marx’s objective was “the dictatorship of the proletariat,” the coercive means he advocated were quite consistent with his ends.
GALAMBOS’ APPROACH
Galambos’ ideology works out to be the exact antithesis of Marx’s. He treated humanity as a population of volitional, autonomous and sentient individuals, each of whom owned his life and all the derivatives of that life. Whereas Marx favored persons of need over those of ability, Galambos’ treated all persons alike, equal in moral standing. He considered every person sovereign over his own estate, that each is an owner regardless of the amount of property in his possession, property being his life and all of its proper derivatives. He appealed to human rationality and individual self-esteem and he was uncompromisingly individualistic and volitional in his approach. He had no use for “classes.”
As a scientist, Galambos knew that, regardless of what people believe, nature (including those very people) will prevail in the end. He also knew that the popularity of an ideology only affects the rate of change toward whatever ends sought, realistic or otherwise. Only science can illuminate realistic objectives. So the ideology must be consistent with if not actually subservient to the pertinent scientific theory or else the momentum of change might well be in the wrong direction. To ensure his approach was realistic in the long run, Galambos gave priority to the use of scientific method over all other considerations. Characteristically, he always led off his courses with the question “How do you know you are right?” He then fashioned an approach to social change based on his apprehension of humanity as he found it emphasizing scientific and technological development because those subjects were less tainted with propaganda. He relied on science to reveal how human society works to the extent that it does, finding self-interest, an enduring trait of humanity, to be his ally rather than his nemesis. He found support for his hypothesis in the “pursuit of happiness” clause in the Declaration of Independence. And he discovered that the beauty of laissez capitalism is not that it encourages human greed but that it renders it harmless if not actually creative and productive, from which he taught that to profit is moral and it is moral to seek profit.
A TURN OF MIND
As he made progress in scientific terms, Galambos would find out and point to what was the “right” as it pertains to social phenomena. Among those conclusions he would also point out what might be termed “moral” and “ethical” as those terms have come to classify human behavior in terms of its effect on peace and tranquility in the neighborhood. The quality and quantity of this body of “knowledge” would be the basis of his ideology. Although intellectual honesty is a rare commodity, Galambos’ approach struck a nerve with a sufficient number of like-minded individuals to make a market for his lectures on the subject.
However, inasmuch as science does not produce results CERTAIN, science could not readily satisfy Galambos’ quest for an “absolute morality,” a quest that became more compelling as he struggled to make his ideology more alluring to the public. Since popularity could accelerate progress as he envisioned it in ideological terms, he was soon persuaded to stake a claim to this moral high-ground to facilitate the attraction of those persons who were seeking definite and simple answers to the poignant and sometimes ambiguous social problems in evidence, which were often threatening to humanity and inhibitive of social progress as they saw it. This turn of mind toward definite answers to specific dilemmas was initially a marketing decision, but inasmuch as it received an enthusiastic response from his market, it became the predominant feature of his program from then on. It also imparted a decidedly “righteous” character to his campaign which tended to squelch skepticism thereby strengthening the ideology at the expense of the science.
When Galambos assumed he already knew what is universally “moral,” or at least “immoral,” without first accrediting such a conclusion through scientific procedures, he justified a third and overriding criterion of “rightness” that was outside the scope of traditional scientific deliberations. This special or ad hoc criterion he considered relevant only to social phenomena. This was certainly a novel idea in the annals of science. However, it introduced unfamiliar epistemological issues in the process. While such a postulate no doubt boosted the potency of his ideological appeal and simplified his ideological approach, it severely compromised his scientific position as regards society inasmuch as it arbitrarily set aside social phenomena as something extra-natural. To say the least, it was premature to introduce “absolute morality” (meaning universal morality) into an ideology as long as the underlying science was immature on the question. For example, a good deal of ambiguity yet remains to be resolved on the question of intellectual proprietorship notwithstanding Galambos’ “Theory of Primary Property.”[viii]
Galambos himself had explained the impropriety of giving priority to ideology over science when he contrasted Milliken’s “electron discovery” with Ehrenhaft’s microcoulomb research. He pointed out how Milliken postulated his answer based on his ideological belief in Lorenz’s electron theory, namely that “there is an electron and I’m going to measure its charge.” He then fitted his crude oil-drop data to support his hypothesis. He got the Nobel Prize for his cleverness, not for his science.
Galambos admired Ehrenhaft’s truly scientific approach to the question. He would explore the domain of small electrical charges to look for the existence of a particular one called the electron. Ehrenhaft meticulously measured diminishingly small electrical charges with great precision as they were found to occur in nature. As a result, he discovered that among all the small electrical charges extant, there appeared a prominent population of charges having the value of Milliken’s “electron.” Thus, it was really Ehrenhaft who corroborated Lorenz’s hypothesis and, in doing so, he extended the frontier of knowledge of all electronic phenomena. Milliken’s work was finished when he got Nobel recognition whereas Ehrenhaft’s was just beginning.
This story of the electron discovery would recall for Galambos one of Eddington’s about the “ichthyologist’s net,” illustrating how epistemological problems arise when the means employed for the research are inconsistent with the conclusions to be supported.[ix] More importantly, the selectively subjective nature of knowledge according to Eddington was revealed in which a seed of doubt always remains about the immutable universe regardless of the excellence of the science.
SHIFTING EMPHASIS
It is curious that when Galambos attached such terms as “absolute rightness” to his social conclusions, he broke faith with Eddington’s advice. Yet, by his own admission, Galambos put the cart before the horse when he implemented an ideological program irrespective of its underlying scientific basis — especially its epistemology.
When Galambos decided to make FEI an ideological venture, he put research and literature on the back burner where they would be less likely distract his market with too many questions to confront and air out in public. By that time (1964), Galambos was confident in his knowledge and anxious to get on with “building” a free society. A divergence of views developed on this matter, not least the very idea of building society by human design. Some in the community of FEI students argued out of engineering habit that the research must be done up front in order to get the program “right” the first time out. Others saw no problem with the promotion of abstract idealism as long as nature was to be depended on to take its mysterious course — in other words, let the “market” decide. There was nothing essentially antagonistic in these contending viewpoints since both were valid in their respective contexts and no compulsion was involved. However, Galambos had come to believe he did not have time to first advance the science before promoting belief in and practice of those certain new institutions that he was convinced would be confirmed by experience. He was impatient to reduce them to practice himself regardless of the maturity of his know-how or of the market demand for such. He was frustrated in the knowledge that growth in the social know-how of the individual would pace the evolution of the social structure toward the ideal he envisioned regardless of the urgency of the global situation or the eloquence of the ideological appeal. He convinced himself and many others that his “technology” was a fait accompli. But as of the time of his death in 1997, there was little evidence extant to support his claim.
For some, Galambos’ emphasis on moralistic notions seemed anachronistic, conceited and arrogant. His high-minded ideological manner suggested that a kind of aristocratic authority had crept into his program. In addition, he began to exhibit signs of obsession with visions of immortality. In retrospect, it is fortunate the roles were not reversed between him and his students because no one was equipped to take his place in his ideological program, which was inspirational by all accounts. At the same time, Galambos made his skeptics place more meaningful even if they were on the outside looking in.
An attractive and persuasive feature of Galambos’ approach was a glossary of cogent and precise definitions of the key words he employed in constructing his theory. In this glossary, he exemplified the virtues of science in giving specific, unambiguous meaning to the key words he would be relying on to proceed with his development. The word “absolute” is a case in point. Among dozens of meanings listed in the lexicon of common usage, Galambos adopted the one from physics, namely that “an absolute is independent of arbitrary standards of determination.” This definition would serve as a reminder of the importance of “operationalizing” the definitions of other key words to the greatest extent possible to provide instruction as to how anyone can make the determination for himself.[x] In taking this approach, Galambos sought to demonstrate to others how science, particularly physics, had become the powerfully useful discipline that it is in acquiring reliable new knowledge of the world.
CHALLENGING DEFINITIONS
Ideologically, the only grounds for arguing with Galambos’ definitions are internal or logical consistency in HIS argument. Since it was after all HIS theory and he had long labored over such problems early in his program, it would be very difficult for even the most conscientious student to find fault. Such scrutiny has been made even more challenging by the fact that Galambos left little written material open for study. That arguments remain in making precise settlements of ownership issues under some important circumstances is evidence that refinements in his definitions are needed. But most of all, the test of Galambos’ theory of the social world would come from observational experience, just as he taught.
Galambos encountered a particularly vexatious problem of definition as he grappled with his concept of “absolute morality,” which he made the central feature of his ideology. The problem arises in attempting to operationalize the definition of the term “morality,” i.e. moral independent of arbitrary standards of determination. Since he retained the conventional polar notion of morality as a contest of “good” versus “evil” in human terms, he needed a more universal term with which to express moral distinctions precisely. He found such a tool in the word “property,” used in its singular sense that is traditional in economic, ethical, common-law and political deliberations wherein it is common to refer to “private property” as the province of the individual human being. As a result, he deprived himself of the utility of the term “property” in its plural, scientific sense referring to natural attributes having no moral connotation whatever but otherwise indispensible as tools in the scientific investigation of any province of natural phenomena. It is unfortunate that the singular usage would necessarily preempt the plural usage traditional in scientific endeavor. But the singular sense is consistent with traditional moral philosophy. At least his precise but non-scientific definition of “property” and its counterpart “plunder” would allow a coherent treatment of morality consistent with tradition. This was an important ideological consideration inasmuch as it aligned him with respectable philosophical antecedents like Moses, John Locke, Adam Smith and Frederic Bastiat.
Galambos encountered a logical circularity in his definition of property (the good) when he relied on a definition of what property is not, namely plunder (the bad). He defined plunder to be the result of coercion which he defined in turn as an intentional interference with property. So it was HIS problem to sort out what was and was not property on the basis of what was and was not a “moral” means of acquisition.
Since moral means could be observed (peaceful production) but immoral means could not (by virtue of the invisibility of intent in his definition of coercion), frustrations arose in applications of Galambos’ theory of morality. The question is not so much whether usurpation, trespass and harm can be observed to occur to one at the hand of another. The problem that remains in applying Galambos’ theory is to differentiate intent to harm from simple inadvertence or greed. Such a distinction is important if morality is to become more than a matter of arbitrary opinion and fulfill Galambos’ claim to the discovery of “absolute morality.”
Galambos never fully resolved this problem to anyone’s satisfaction including his own. Yet, he was obliged make moral judgments if only to demonstrate to his students how they should behave, at least toward him if not also toward others. Some have angrily reacted to this discrepancy in his theory as hypocrisy. Such a reaction is understandable since Galambos assumed such a high moral position. On the other hand, this discrepancy can be considered to be merely unfinished business and not just a hopelessly discrediting flaw, which he might have rectified had he lived longer.
As long as he was alive, such discrepancies were exclusively HIS business. Now that he is not, they are attached to his intellectual and literary estate about which many are in doubt as to how the subject matter will be administered and accessed. Any discrepancies in his definitions that lead to an ownership dilemma should be looked upon as a problem to be solved in his honor. After all, he gave us the property postulate and showed us how proprietary administration was the grand alternative to politics and bureaucracy.[xi] Where would we be now without these insights? The obverse of this question is “what can we do with them now?”
Some “true believers” fail to see any problem at all with Galambos’ definitions, which so neatly and elegantly satisfy their longing for order in experience that “minor” discrepancies are readily overlooked or tolerated considering the alternatives. They tend to regard all attempts to amend the definitions as grandstanding at Galambos’ expense. No doubt there will be some who will be just trying to stir up matters as self-serving gestures, safe enough now that Galambos is dead. However, some students are uninhibited in their inquiries as a result of having some precedence in the matter. A few can trace their concerns back to the origin of the problem in Galambos’ theory. Others may have acquired similar insights independently of Galambos. More recent FEI graduates who uncritically embrace Galambos’ ideology tend to be intellectually paralyzed as if his definitions were off-limits to inquiry, thus setting aside these issues as morally forbidden territory. Such a posture inclines them to condemn others still searching and to overlook Galambos’ more fundamental consideration never to waver from dedication to science. Therefore, Galambos’ students can be assured of the propriety of subjecting any definitions to a proper logical and observational test on the basis of scientific merit and on their own recognizance.
Important questions arise regarding Galambos’ definition of property and how to apply it. These questions seem to fall into two categories, one abstract and the other practical. Questions of the first type, illustrated above, relate to the strength of the logic underlying Galambos’ ideological program regardless of any scientific support for it. The second type has to do with operationalization for the purpose facilitating the essential falsification step in the scientific method. Both types of questions must be answered in the course of any scientific advancement of the theory as required to support a practical and enduring social ideology.
Obviously, any definition that staggers application for fear of obscure moral consequences will be socially dysfunctional. After all, the only way one could be “absolutely” sure his actions would never raise a moral issue is to abstain from taking any initiative whatsoever. Without taking any action at risk of committing an “immoral” act, a person will soon find his most moral but utterly paralyzed life had become an unbearable misery not to be endured for long. Ultimately, all such “moral” persons will have ceased to contribute to the human gene pool, the evolution of the species thereby proceeding on the basis of more realistic human inclinations. It is a thoroughly medieval notion that there can be any essential conflict between morality and reality for the perfection of the species. If “heaven” can never be here on Earth to be experienced by diligent human beings, then “heaven” is merely an abstraction designed by the cunning to manipulate the gullible.
A refinement in Galambos’ definition of property must be made if only to strengthen his theoretical argument for human freedom or liberty as he defined those terms. In addition, the definition must be operationalized to facilitate reductions to practice in the real world to enhance human life and advance reliable and unambiguous (i.e. scientific) understanding of the process to make it more relevant and repeatable into the indefinite future. Since Galambos can no longer do this job for himself, it remains for others to take the risk of trying to do what he would have done eventually had he lived long enough. The main risk here is a short-run loss of ideological potency from a weakened (i.e. more tentative) moral argument. In the long run, this disadvantage will be more than offset by an invigorated scientific impetus leading to a more realistic and therefore strengthened concept of morality. Then, the absence of Galambos’ personal charisma will not be so critical to social progress.
Perhaps no more radical an amendment to Galambos’ definition of property is required than to simply drop any dependence on “non-coercion” and rely on what “volition” is all about. This achievement calls for some astute biological and psychological insight in order to be able to differentiate between mere animal behavior and uniquely human behavior. Perhaps also in this regard, even more should be made of Galambos’ integrity concept, but such a development is likely to stress individual competence and prudence — know-how and self government — rather than avoidance of immorality and submission to restitution. True enough, this approach will soften the ideology but it will strengthen the theory for proceeding on to scientific and technological application. It might even result in liberating “Property” from its bondage to singular usage such that whatever property of humanity that term formerly stood for becomes one among many natural attributes to understand. Then, instead of postulating morality or a perfectly moral humanity as an ideal, a possibly unattainable state of affairs, we set about to find out what moral behavior consists of and how it can be practiced successfully in the real world. We already have a pretty good idea of this approach, thanks to Galambos, just like Milliken and Ehrenhaft did regarding the discovery of the electron thanks to Lorenz.
Operationalism challenges the definitions to provide instruction as to how to make observations regarding actual human behavior “independent of arbitrary standards of determination” in the pursuit of scientific inquiry. If not to actually make quantitative measurements with them, we have to be able to at least explain to each other how to look at the consequences of the definitions and come to unambiguous conclusions or non-contradictory identification. We can certainly learn how to observe conflict but it is doubtful that enough can be known to observe intent. Can psychology be trusted to rule on such a critical moral matter? This is where epistemology comes into play and psychology has a conflict of interest in the subject inasmuch as it purports to understand human behavior while claiming exclusive province over knowledge of human mental faculties.
THE FUTURE OF VOLITIONAL SCIENCE
Extrapolations from physics into the social domain are always hazardous but the analogy between the individualistic model of human social behavior and Planck’s quantum oscillator regarding electromagnetic radiative emission is enticing. For example, among all the “degrees of freedom” possessed by the quantum, the particular one that will be expressed in actuality (like a particular color of photonic light) will always satisfy the Principle of Least Action. That is all that can be inferred about the “intent” of the quantum. Likewise, at any given time, the human individual will express the particular one of his many possible options for action that fits into a least-action paradigm. Such a choice has been termed “the pursuit of happiness,” a characterization that offers no insight whatsoever into the nature of the specific intent behind it.
An interesting question is how Galambos’ “integrity of property principle” might be related to the principle of least action. If such a relationship can be established, it deserves to be called “Galambos’ Law” and that property of volitional beings now known as “Property” might be named the “galambosian” or some other term to distinguish it from the properties of volitional humanity in general. This practice would be consistent with the practices of physics, which regard mass, momentum, charge, position, etc. as distinguishable properties of the quantum. But it is the specific property known as the “Hamiltonian” that provides the greatest utility in ascertaining which of all possible courses of physical action is the most likely.[xii] The Hamiltonian is formulated in terms of “action,” not energy. In nature, action is minimized. Likewise, energy is conserved.
THE QUESTION OF JUSTICE
Forensic science has developed considerable confidence in the means for establishing responsibility for consequences on the basis of physical evidence. However, this profession can do little to prove intent. Thus, for any dispute adjudication to have a peaceful if not amicable outcome — an ideal of a “free society” — it cannot rely on retaliation based on a presumption of intent to injure. The beauty of Galambos (or possibly Estes’) restitution theory of justice is that it depends only on establishing responsibility regardless of the nature of the intent (if any) of those whose actions are connected with an injury to another. Also, only comparative responsibility is relevant since there is always a question of contributory negligence to consider. A theory of damages is yet another matter.
Few would argue that a person accused of causing injury to others is entitled to be judged solely on the facts of the consequences of his acts. From such an individualistic standpoint, a question of guilt or innocence must be resolved on the basis of the degree of responsibility for consequences, which can be measured, not the magnitude of intent to injure, which cannot. Thus it appears, after all, that there is some merit to the so-called “presumption of innocence” principle and none whatsoever for punitive damages. Consequently, the question of moral turpitude is irrelevant to restitution. Yet, according to Galambos, restitution is the criterion of justice. Curiously then, justice need not invoke moral considerations.
Since judicial processes cannot rely on a factual determination of guilt of malicious intent, punitive damages awarded in the course of so-called civil cases and fines and other punishments imposed in so-called felony matters are clearly arbitrary exactions from the accused. The operation of the “peoples” court in rendering such opinions to effect a sanction of enforcement inevitably spreads the responsibility for the damages, actual or potential, to “the public” whereby the conflict is not so much resolved as it is diluted. This is true whether the opinion is rendered by a jury collectively practicing one form of nose-counting or another (as if a majority vote could substitute for observational truth) or by a wise and learned officer of the court acting in good conscience.
Punishment for “sin” is not a human province. Behavior that is at odds with nature receives condign punishment in nature in due course without the benefit of human intervention. Vindication of the “right” by human resort to retribution after the fact of injury constitutes an initiative act of force based on synthetic or superhuman authority. Science offers no prospect of elevating mere human beings to such an authoritarian status by any means whatsoever.
This is not to say that there is no such thing as intent to injure, or that when humans commit injurious acts against their fellows it means nothing more than when the other animals do. In fact, as pointed out by Grannis, intent is inherent in the volitional phenomenon as indicated by the etymology of the word.[xiii] Thus, “intent,” whatever it is, must be considered a universal mental factor underlying all voluntary human action. It is just that one can never KNOW “intent” with enough confidence to justify retaliation tit for tat — an eye for an eye, etc. Restitution promotes rationality whereas retaliation and retribution promote only victimhood and enmity.
This position may appear naive in consideration of historical practices and what we generally refer to as a “right” (i.e. a legitimate authority) to react forcefully in self-defense against aggression. Self-preservation is inherent in all living organisms and there is no doubt a strong psychological attachment among humans to the IDEA of being vindicated “right” (i.e. morally righteous) and punishing “wrongdoing.” This drive suggests it may be important to distinguish between what is truly human from what is commonly animal. That was the idea behind Spencer Heath’s proposal to distinguish “society” as a certain peaceful, reciprocal and productive population within the human population at large.[xiv] Galambos’ “moral island” and “spaceland” metaphors might also be fitted into this paradigm.
So here’s where we need to refine our definition of volition or humanity so that we can know when we are dealing with animal behavior generally and human behavior specifically. This is a problem because we humans have a dual nature. We are switch hitters. We can all revert to our animal origins under certain circumstances. Sex and politics are cases in point. So are street brawls, gun fights, fisticuffs and contact sports.
DIFFERENTIATING SCIENCE FROM IDEOLOGY
An authentic science of volition should be able to shed light on when it is appropriate for humans to behave in accordance with their animal or social natures, and what are the specific circumstances that apply in either case. Also, the science should be able to predict the consequences free of any preconceived moral coloration.
Distinguishing science from ideology is a matter of differentiating between critical study and impassioned belief. How we study a part of the world is both complemented and impaired by how we believe the world to be. This challenge to intellectual honesty was well put recently by a couple of biology-oriented computer scientists:[xv]
There is a distinct difference between choosing a particular point of view for exploring a problem and insisting that a particular viewpoint is the only correct description. There may even be good methodological reasons to argue for caricature in a given instance. One of the things that frustrates non-scientists about the practitioners of science is their willing but fickle embrace of caricature. This methodological stance — simplify until forced to do something else — is generally justified by pointing to the productivity of a given simplification: it generates testable hypotheses….. [to which] we can add nuance by including ever more constraints and connections…. thus placing epicycles on epicycles. In this direction lies a top-heavy and unworkable theory. So we return to a simpleton version…. which can provide a [testable] hypothesis generating machine, not just a story-rationalizing machine.
I offer these views merely to suggest that there are still other dimensions to be accounted for in what Galambos has referred to as “spaceland.” Perhaps it would be useful to think of “flatland” as the critter world and to “spaceland” as the human domain. I don’t think Abbott would take offense at this characterization.[xvi] However, this application of Abbott’s imagery might well be inconsistent with what Galambos had in mind.
What is “capitalism?” Galambos considered it an ideology. It must be. After all, the word ends with “-ism.” Linguistics aside, capitalism can also be seen as a social or economic technology. How should that concept be named? Capitalogy?
According to one knowledgeable observer:
Capitalism produces wealth; it makes people richer than any other system. Capitalism we define as merely a state of nature…where people are free to go about their business based on customary, consensual rules in an evolved, vernacular market system. The more you tamper with it, the less well it works.[xvii]
CLOSURE
There is no disrespect in recognizing that Galambos left unfinished business. Perhaps he was keeping some things he knew to himself and overlooked a few things we now find important. In any event, it is safe to say that the development of volitional science will never be “finished.”
After all, Galambos was only human and it does him no credit to treat him otherwise. This is a good time of year (Easter) to be remembering this fact. It is entirely conceivable to me that Jesus might have meant more to the race had he not been deified by his disciples and “churchified” by his adversaries. Richard Nesbit, an early FEI lecturer, once referred to this phenomenon in his presentation of Course 100 as “church-ianity.” Galambos was not amused but Nesbit’s point was clear.
REFERENCES AND NOTES
* The proletariat. from the Latin proletarius, meaning a citizen of the lowest class, is a term used to designate the lowest social class. It became Marxist jargon for the working class in the emerging industrial world of the 19th Century. A member of such a collective of people is a proletarian, originally identified as those people who had no wealth other than their children. Marx’s proletarians owned nothing but their undifferentiated physical labor, which doomed them in his view of the world to perpetual wage slavery. As a result, they would need a socialist state as he prescribed for protection from the greedy capitalists. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proletariat Thus, the national state is conceived as a protection racket.
[1] Morris R. Cohen and Ernest Nagel, Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method,” Harcourt, Brace &
Co., 1934.
[2] Joseph A. Galambos, “Why Does a Company Which Practices and Promotes Capitalism Call Itself LIBERAL?” THRUST FOR FREEDOM–NO. 1, The Liberal Publishing Co., Inc., Los Angeles, 1962
[3] Andrew J. Galambos, “Capitalism, The key to Survival,” Course 100, Free Enterprise Institute, Los
Angeles, 1961.
[iv] Frederic Bastiat, Social Fallacies [Economic Sophisms], Patrick James Stirling Translation, Register Publishing Co., Santa Ana, CA, 1944.
[v] Chutzpah is the Yiddish word for colossal nerve or unmitigated gall. Theodore Bikel defines a person with chutzpah as one who murders his parents, then pleads for mercy in court on account he is an orphan (From Martin Marcus, Yiddish for Yankees, Lippincott, New York, 1968).
[vi] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, 1847.
[viii] Andrew J. Galambos, “The Theory and Protection of primary property,” Free Enterprise Institute
Course V-201.
[ix] Arthur S. Eddington, The Philosophy of Physical Science, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1958, pp.16-27.
[x] Percy W. Bridgman, The Nature of Physical Theory, Princeton University Press, 1936, p. 5.
[xi] Andrew J. Galambos, Sic Itur ad Astra, Universal Scientific Publishing Co., Coronado, CA, 1998.
[xiii] Larry Grannis, “The Lexicon of Volition,” E-mail L8, Saturday, 18 April, 1998, 01:40:21 -0700.
[xiv] Spencer Heath, Citadel, Market and Altar–Emerging Society, Science of Society Foundation,
Elkridge, MD, 1957. (Heather Foundation, Spencer Heath MacCallum, Intellectual Estate Trustee,
P.O. Box 180, Tonopah, NV 89049.)
[xv] Jeremy C. Ahouse and Robert C. Berwick, “Darwin on the Mind — Evolutionary Psychology is in Fashion but is Any of it True,” An essay review of Steven Pinker’s book How the Mind Works (W.W. Norton, 1998), Boston Review, April/May, 1998. p.36.
[xvi] Edwin A. Abbott, Flatland — A Romance of Many Dimensions, Sixth Edition, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1950.
[xvii] Bill Bonner, “Capitalism and the American Way,” The Daily Reckoning, London, England, Monday,
February 4, 2008.
____________________________________________________________________________
Spencer Heath Archive
Item 3064
Commentary by Alvin Lowi on Galambos
February 14, 2002
Property, according to Spencer Heath, is anything that can become the subject matter of contract. Heath didn’t try to incorporate morality into his definition. Locke and Galambos, on the other hand, each started out by saying that an individual owns himself, and went from there to justify the ownership of other things (except, as we have seen land and natural resources). Although optimally each individual does own himself, it can easily be observed that most societies condone the practice of slavery. Heath predicted that those societies that most condoned slavery would be the least progressive in terms of life-years.
To be useful, a definition is descriptive of something. For Heath, “property” describes one way in which people interact with respect to scarce resources. It describes a kind of observable behavior. He doesn’t start with a moral premise that “man owns himself” and then build from there. A normative statement is not a definition; we shouldn’t confuse it with a natural science, descriptive approach to understanding social behavior. Galambos’ so-called definition is really a moral prescription and has nothing to do with observed behavior. What Galambos is saying is that people should everywhere have exclusive jurisdiction over themselves. He is certainly not observing that they everywhere do, since people clearly do not everywhere own themselves. As a matter of fact, we observe the opposite. While none but small pockets of chattel slavery remain in the world, national governments everywhere enslave their populations. Each year, they tell them how much of their product they may keep, and it is almost universally deemed legitimate that they should hold the power of life or death over any who resist. Galambos’ is a rallying cry against the perceived injustice of government just as Locke’s was in resisting the king in the 17th century. Neither is describing social or any other observed natural phenomena. As reporters, they are utterly untrue to the facts.
SH proposed the unit of “man years.” He predicted that where two populations are equal in numbers by census count but vary significantly in terms of man-years, this difference would correlate with a difference in economic liberty. In general terms, anything conducive to greater man-years in the population is social, and the reverse is anti-social. It was in this light that he examined all institutions–art, science, politics.
It’s commonly said that man is born free. He is not. Freedom is both learned and earned. Freedom is the extent of one’s options, the breadth of one’s ability, and that is determined primarily by one’s technical expertise and knowledge — of which we have very little if any at birth. Ignorance is the chief limitation upon our freedom. It can be argued that it is not the only limitation, since restraints can be imposed by other people or circumstances. Even there, however, knowledge is determinant–knowledge how to nullify or evade such restraint or turn it to advantage. The condition characterized by absence of restraint by others is called liberty. Although the two words are often used interchangeably, liberty is a very minor sub-category of freedom. As compared with ignorance, tyranny is a comparatively minor limitation on our freedom. It only looms large because we chafe under it. When we say that freedom is earned as well as learned or discovered, we mean not only that we earn it by the conscientious exercise of our mental faculties, but by conscientiously serving others in ways that in turn prompt them to serve us. That makes both better off than before the exchange and hence more free. Each has earned an increment of freedom by freely exchanging goods or services with another.
Metadata
| Title | Correspondence - 3064 |
| Collection Name | Spencer Heath Archive |
| Series | Correspondence |
| Box number | 19:3031-3184 |
| Document number | 3064 |
| Date / Year | 1942-1962 |
| Authors / Creators / Correspondents | Ludwig von Mises |
| Description | Mises Correspondence - to, from and about Ludwig von Mises. The last 20 pages beginning on page 32, following discussions of Mises’ epistemology, have to do with the nature of science, by Alvin Lowi. |
| Keywords | Mises Correspondence |