Galambos’ recognized at the outset that as a social movement, his ideological program for “liberalism” (meaning laissez faire capitalism) owned a superficial resemblance to Karl Marx’s campaign for “scientific socialism” launched over 100 years earlier when these ideological labels were sharply differentiated in the public mind.⁴ However, Galambos, the professor of astrophysics and consultant to the aerospace industry, had an advantage over Marx, the unemployed lawyer and rabble-rouser. When it came to science, Galambos knew whereof he spoke. He was mindful of a fact of nature that the means employed for whatever purpose must be consistent with the ends sought and that both must conform to the dictates of nature as best they can be comprehended. He was under no illusions that nature could be second-guessed or subjected to conquest no matter the public clamor for such.

GALAMBOS VERSUS MARX

Curiously, both Marx and Galambos were innovators who claimed their approaches to the exposition of human social life were scientifically justified and that their wholly opposite means would attain precisely identical social ends, namely human freedom. The question immediately arises as to which of these starkly contrasting ideologies is the more authentic and realistic in the long run?

Until the relatively recent demise of the 75 year old Soviet Socialist Empire, few would have embraced Galambos’ views over Marx’s. Yet, Galambos had impeccable scientific credentials as well as solid evidence for advancing his hypotheses. Marx had none, but he made up for his deficiencies with ample fancy and chutzpah. Apparently, when it came to public promotion, Marx’s appeal to vanity gave him a short-term advantage. The longer term consequences would not become apparent to scientific observation for over a generation. Even then, life would afford only so much leisure.

Fundamentally, Galambos believed that the best humans could attain in the world would be harmonious accommodation with the nature of the world as it is, which is to be obtained only through scientific understanding. Accordingly, after a brief flirtation with the “Goldwater-for-President” movement at the Republican National Convention in 1960, he abandoned political participation of any kind, concentrating on the purely social phenomena that endure from generation to generation without conflict.

By contrast, Karl Marx postulated the existence of social classes in perpetual conflict that would remain so until all the classes were forcefully merged into a uniform class of survivors, the most numerous class, which he labeled the “proletariat.”* Marx’s “science” established that this result could only be accomplished by force since the privileges and wealth characterizing the minority privileged “classes” would never abandon their privileges voluntarily. Marx also understood that the most numerous class could be incited to riot over envy of the more wealthy, a battle they would win by sheer force of numbers. Accordingly, he developed and promoted an ideological program of political action to foment and intensify “class” conflict as a prelude to the expropriation of the “bourgeoisie” (middle class, merchants or business people) and forceful regimentation of the “proletariat” (“lower-class” laborers or wage-earners).⁴ Marx thus advocated “class” warfare where the classes were arbitrary or statistical demographic artifacts constructed to purpose. His program had ideological appeal because the vast majority were inclined to envy the few holders of wealth and could be enticed to encroach once convinced of the right.

Marx had no familiarity with science as that endeavor had come to be known from the works of the likes of Galileo and Newton. His expertise was superficial at best and strictly rhetorical. He was a scientist in name only, the term “science” having been introduced into the English language as recently as 1833 by William Whewell. 

Nevertheless, Marx’s approach was highly relevant to and opportunistic for the attainment of political ends, as the modern history of national governments will attest. In that sense, Marx could be considered a political scientist with at least as much of a claim to the title as Nicolo Machiavelli, who’s ______ is indubitable. We are here defining political science as the science of human conquest by humans.

Marx’s stated political objective was to create a classless society by what he claimed to be scientific means. Although his claims to social science were purely rhetorical, his political science was realistic insofar as he was offering expeditious and opportunistic means to attain the ends he sought. His approach was totally collectivistic and coercive yet appealing to base human emotions, showing those more vicious than he how to exploit peoples’ susceptibility to greed, envy and vanity. Since Marx’s objective was “the dictatorship of the proletariat,” the coercive means he advocated were quite consistent with his ends.

GALAMBOS’ APPROACH

Galambos’ ideology works out to be the exact antithesis of Marx’s. He treated humanity as a population of volitional, autonomous and sentient individuals, each of whom owned his life and all the derivatives of that life. Whereas Marx favored persons of need over those of ability, Galambos’ treated all persons alike, equal in moral standing. He considered every person sovereign over his own estate, that each is an owner regardless of the amount of property in his possession, property being his life and all of its proper derivatives. He appealed to human rationality and individual self-esteem and he was uncompromisingly individualistic and volitional in his approach. He had no use for “classes.”

As a scientist, Galambos knew that, regardless of what people believe, nature (including those very people) will prevail in the end. He also knew that the popularity of an ideology only affects the rate of change toward whatever ends sought, realistic or otherwise. Only science can illuminate realistic objectives. So the ideology must be consistent with if not actually subservient to the pertinent scientific theory or else the momentum of change might well be in the wrong direction. To ensure his approach was realistic in the long run, Galambos gave priority to the use of scientific method over all other considerations. Characteristically, he always led off his courses with the question “How do you know you are right?” He then fashioned an approach to social change based on his apprehension of humanity as he found it emphasizing scientific and technological development because those subjects were less tainted with propaganda. He relied on science to reveal how human society works to the extent that it does, finding self-interest, an enduring trait of humanity, to be his ally rather than his nemesis. He found support for his hypothesis in the “pursuit of happiness” clause in the Declaration of Independence.  And he discovered that the beauty of laissez capitalism is not that it encourages human greed but that it renders it harmless if not actually creative and productive, from which he taught that to profit is moral and it is moral to seek profit. 

A TURN OF MIND

As he made progress in scientific terms, Galambos would find out and point to what was the “right” as it pertains to social phenomena. Among those conclusions he would also point out what might be termed “moral” and “ethical” as those terms have come to classify human behavior in terms of its effect on peace and tranquility in the neighborhood. The quality and quantity of this body of “knowledge” would be the basis of his ideology. Although intellectual honesty is a rare commodity, Galambos’ approach struck a nerve with a sufficient number of like-minded individuals to make a market for his lectures on the subject.

However, inasmuch as science does not produce results CERTAIN, science could not readily satisfy Galambos’ quest for an “absolute morality,” a quest that became more compelling as he struggled to make his ideology more alluring to the public. Since popularity could accelerate progress as he envisioned it in ideological terms, he was soon persuaded to stake a claim to this moral high-ground to facilitate the attraction of those persons who were seeking definite and simple answers to the poignant and sometimes ambiguous social problems in evidence, which were often threatening to humanity and inhibitive of social progress as they saw it. This turn of mind toward definite answers to specific dilemmas was initially a marketing decision, but inasmuch as it received an enthusiastic response from his market, it became the predominant feature of his program from then on. It also imparted a decidedly “righteous” character to his campaign which tended to squelch skepticism thereby strengthening the ideology at the expense of the science.

When Galambos assumed he already knew what is universally  “moral,” or at least “immoral,” without first accrediting such a conclusion through scientific procedures, he justified a third and overriding criterion of “rightness” that was outside the scope of traditional scientific deliberations. This special or ad hoc criterion he considered relevant only to social phenomena. This was certainly a novel idea in the annals of science. However, it introduced unfamiliar epistemological issues in the process. While such a postulate no doubt boosted the potency of his ideological appeal and simplified his ideological approach, it severely compromised his scientific position as regards society inasmuch as it arbitrarily set aside social phenomena as something extra-natural. To say the least, it was premature to introduce “absolute morality” (meaning universal morality) into an ideology as long as the underlying science was immature on the question. For example, a good deal of ambiguity yet remains to be resolved on the question of intellectual proprietorship notwithstanding Galambos’ “Theory of Primary Property.”⁷ 

Galambos himself had explained the impropriety of giving priority to ideology over science when he contrasted Milliken’s “electron discovery” with Ehrenhaft’s microcoulomb research. He pointed out how Milliken postulated his answer based on his ideological belief in Lorenz’s electron theory, namely that “there is an electron and I’m going to measure its charge.” He then fitted his crude oil-drop data to support his hypothesis. He got the Nobel Prize for his cleverness, not for his science.

Galambos admired Ehrenhaft’s truly scientific approach to the question. He would explore the domain of small electrical charges to look for the existence of a particular one called the electron. Ehrenhaft meticulously measured diminishingly small electrical charges with great precision as they were found to occur in nature. As a result, he discovered that among all the small electrical charges extant, there appeared a prominent population of charges having the value of Milliken’s “electron.” Thus, it was really Ehrenhaft who corroborated Lorenz’s hypothesis and, in doing so, he extended the frontier of knowledge of all electronic phenomena. Milliken’s work was finished when he got Nobel recognition whereas Ehrenhaft’s was just beginning.

His story of the electron discovery would recall for Galambos one of Eddington’s about the “ichthyologist’s net,” illustrating how epistemological problems arise when the means employed for the research are inconsistent with the conclusions to be supported.⁸ More importantly, the selectively subjective nature of knowledge according to Eddington was revealed in which a seed of doubt always remains about the immutable universe regardless of the excellence of the science.

SHIFTING EMPHASIS

It is curious that when Galambos attached such terms as “absolute rightness” to his social conclusions, he broke faith with Eddington’s advice. Yet, by his own admission, Galambos put the cart before the horse when he implemented an ideological program irrespective of its underlying scientific basis — especially its epistemology.

When Galambos decided to make FEI an ideological venture, he put research and literature on the back burner where they would be less likely distract his market with too many questions to confront and air out in public. By that time (1964), Galambos was confident in his knowledge and anxious to get on with “building” a free society. A divergence of views developed on this matter, not least the very idea of building society by human design. Some in the community of FEI students argued out of engineering habit that the research must be done up front in order to get the program “right” the first time out. Others saw no problem with the promotion of abstract idealism as long as nature was to be depended on to take its mysterious course — in other words, let the “market” decide. There was nothing essentially antagonistic in these contending viewpoints since both were valid in their respective contexts and no compulsion was involved. However, Galambos had come to believe he did not have time to first advance the science before promoting belief in and practice of those certain new institutions that he was convinced would be confirmed by experience. He was impatient to reduce them to practice himself regardless of the maturity of his know-how or of the market demand for such. He was frustrated in the knowledge that growth in the social know-how of the individual would pace the evolution of the social structure toward the ideal he envisioned regardless of the urgency of the global situation or the eloquence of the ideological appeal. He convinced himself and many others that his “technology” was a fait accompli. But as of the time of his death in 1997, there was little evidence extant to support his claim.

For some, Galambos’ emphasis on moralistic notions seemed anachronistic, conceited and arrogant. His high-minded ideological manner suggested that a kind of aristocratic authority had crept into his program. In addition, he began to exhibit signs of obsession with visions of immortality. In retrospect, it is fortunate the roles were not reversed between him and his students because no one was equipped to take his place in his ideological program, which was inspirational by all accounts. At the same time, Galambos made his skeptics place more meaningful even if they were on the outside looking in.

An attractive and persuasive feature of Galambos’ approach was a glossary of cogent and precise definitions of the key words he employed in constructing his theory. In this glossary, he exemplified the virtues of science in giving specific, unambiguous meaning to the key words he would be relying on to proceed with his development. The word “absolute” is a case in point. Among dozens of meanings listed in the lexicon of common usage, Galambos adopted the one from physics, namely that “an absolute is independent of arbitrary standards of determination.” This definition would serve as a reminder of the importance of “operationalizing” the definitions of other key words to the greatest extent possible to provide instruction as to how anyone can make the determination for himself.⁹ In taking this approach, Galambos sought to demonstrate to others how science, particularly physics, had become the powerfully useful discipline that it is in acquiring reliable new knowledge of the world.

CHALLENGING DEFINITIONS

Ideologically, the only grounds for arguing with Galambos’ definitions are internal or logical consistency in HIS argument. Since it was after all HIS theory and he had long labored over such problems early in his program, it would be very difficult for even the most conscientious student to find fault. Such scrutiny has been made even more challenging by the fact that Galambos left little written material open for study. That arguments remain in making precise settlements of ownership issues under some important circumstances is evidence that refinements in his definitions are needed. But most of all, the test of Galambos’ theory of the social world would come from observational experience, just as he taught.

Galambos encountered a particularly vexatious problem of definition as he grappled with his concept of “absolute morality,” which he made the central feature of his ideology. The problem arises in attempting to operationalize the definition of the term “morality,” i.e. moral independent of arbitrary standards of determination. Since he retained the conventional polar notion of morality as a contest of “good” versus “evil” in human terms, he needed a more universal term with which to express moral distinctions precisely. He found such a tool in the word “property,” used in its singular sense that is traditional in economic, ethical, common-law and political deliberations wherein it is common to refer to “private property” as the province of the individual human being. As a result, he deprived himself of the utility of the term “property” in its plural, scientific sense referring to natural attributes having no moral connotation whatever but otherwise indispensable as tools in the scientific investigation of any province of natural phenomena. It is unfortunate that the singular usage would necessarily preempt the plural usage traditional in scientific endeavor. But the singular sense is consistent with traditional moral philosophy. At least his precise but non-scientific definition of “property” and its counterpart “plunder” would allow a coherent treatment of morality consistent with tradition. This was an important ideological consideration inasmuch as it aligned him with respectable philosophical antecedents like Moses, John Locke, Adam Smith and Frederic Bastiat.

 

Galambos encountered a logical circularity in his definition of property (the good) when he relied on a definition of what property is not, namely plunder (the bad). He defined plunder to be the result of coercion which he defined in turn as an intentional interference with property. So it was HIS problem to sort out what was and was not property on the basis of what was and was not a “moral” means of acquisition.

Since moral means could be observed (peaceful production) but immoral means could not (by virtue of the invisibility of intent in his definition of coercion), frustrations arose in applications of Galambos’ theory of morality. The question is not so much whether usurpation, trespass and harm can be observed to occur to one at the hand of another. The problem that remains in applying Galambos’ theory is to differentiate intent to harm from simple inadvertence or greed. Such a distinction is important if morality is to become more than a matter of arbitrary opinion and fulfill Galambos’ claim to the discovery of “absolute morality.”

Galambos never fully resolved this problem to anyone’s satisfaction including his own. Yet, he was obliged make moral judgments if only to demonstrate to his students how they should behave, at least toward him if not also toward others. Some have angrily reacted to this discrepancy in his theory as hypocrisy. Such a reaction is understandable since Galambos assumed such a high moral position. On the other hand, this discrepancy can be considered to be merely unfinished business and not just a hopelessly discrediting flaw, which he might have rectified had he lived longer.

As long as he was alive, such discrepancies were exclusively HIS business. Now that he is not, they are attached to his intellectual and literary estate about which many are in doubt as to how the subject matter will be administered and accessed. Any discrepancies in his definitions that lead to an ownership dilemma should be looked upon as a problem to be solved in his honor. After all, he gave us the property postulate and showed us how proprietary administration was the grand alternative to politics and bureaucracy.¹⁰ Where would we be now without these insights? The obverse of this question is “what can we do with them now?”

Some “true believers” fail to see any problem at all with Galambos’ definitions, which so neatly and elegantly satisfy their longing for order in experience that “minor” discrepancies are readily overlooked or tolerated considering the alternatives. They tend to regard all attempts to amend the definitions as grandstanding at Galambos’ expense. No doubt there will be some who will be just trying to stir up matters as self-serving gestures, safe enough now that Galambos is dead. However, some students are uninhibited in their inquiries as a result of having some precedence in the matter. A few can trace their concerns back to the origin of the problem in Galambos’ theory. Others may have acquired similar insights independently of Galambos. More recent FEI graduates who uncritically embrace Galambos’ ideology tend to be intellectually paralyzed as if his definitions were off-limits to inquiry, thus setting aside these issues as morally forbidden territory. Such a posture inclines them to condemn others still searching and to overlook Galambos’ more fundamental consideration never to waver from dedication to science. Therefore, Galambos’ students can be assured of the propriety of subjecting any definitions to a proper logical and observational test on the basis of scientific merit and on their own recognizance.

Important questions arise regarding Galambos’ definition of property and how to apply it. These questions seem to fall into two categories, one abstract and the other practical. Questions of the first type, illustrated above, relate to the strength of the logic underlying Galambos’ ideological program regardless of any scientific support for it. The second type has to do with operationalization for the purpose of facilitating the essential falsification step in the scientific method. Both types of questions must be answered in the course of any scientific advancement of the theory as required to support a practical and enduring social ideology.

Obviously, any definition that staggers application for fear of obscure moral consequences will be socially dysfunctional. After all, the only way one could be “absolutely” sure his actions would never raise a moral issue is to abstain from taking any initiative whatsoever. Without taking any action at risk of committing an “immoral” act, a person will soon find his most moral but utterly paralyzed life had become an unbearable misery not to be endured for long. Ultimately, all such “moral” persons will have ceased to contribute to the human gene pool, the evolution of the species thereby proceeding on the basis of more realistic human inclinations. It is a thoroughly medieval notion that there can be any essential conflict between morality and reality for the perfection of the species. If “heaven” can never be here on Earth to be experienced by diligent human beings, then “heaven” is merely an abstraction designed by the cunning to manipulate the gullible.

A refinement in Galambos’ definition of property must be made if only to strengthen his theoretical argument for human freedom or liberty as he defined those terms. In addition, the definition must be operationalized to facilitate reductions to practice in the real world to enhance human life and advance reliable and unambiguous (i.e. scientific) understanding of the process to make it more relevant and repeatable into the indefinite future. Since Galambos can no longer do this job for himself, it remains for others to take the risk of trying to do what he would have done eventually had he lived long enough. The main risk here is a short-run loss of ideological potency from a weakened (i.e. more tentative) moral argument. In the long run, this disadvantage will be more than offset by an invigorated scientific impetus leading to a more realistic and therefore strengthened concept of morality. Then, the absence of Galambos’ personal charisma will not be so critical to social progress.

Perhaps no more radical an amendment to Galambos’ definition of property is required than to simply drop any dependence on “non-coercion” and rely on what “volition” is all about. This achievement calls for some astute biological and psychological insight in order to be able to differentiate between mere animal behavior and uniquely human behavior. Perhaps also in this regard, even more should be made of Galambos’ integrity concept, but such a development is likely to stress individual competence and prudence — know-how and self-government — rather than avoidance of immorality and submission to restitution. True enough, this approach will soften the ideology but it will strengthen the theory for proceeding on to scientific and technological application. It might even result in liberating “Property” from its bondage to singular usage such that whatever property of humanity that term formerly stood for becomes one among many natural attributes to understand. Then, instead of postulating morality or a perfectly moral humanity as an ideal, a possibly unattainable state of affairs, we set about to find out what moral behavior consists of and how it can be practiced successfully in the real world. We already have a pretty good idea of this approach, thanks to Galambos, just like Milliken and Ehrenhaft did regarding the discovery of the electron thanks to Lorenz.

Operationalism challenges the definitions to provide instruction as to how to make observations regarding actual human behavior “independent of arbitrary standards of determination” in the pursuit of scientific inquiry. If not to actually make quantitative measurements with them, we have to be able to at least explain to each other how to look at the consequences of the definitions and come to unambiguous conclusions or non-contradictory identification. We can certainly learn how to observe conflict but it is doubtful that enough can be known to observe intent. Can psychology be trusted to rule on such a critical moral matter? This is where epistemology comes into play and psychology has a conflict of interest in the subject inasmuch as it purports to understand human behavior while claiming exclusive province over knowledge of human mental faculties.

THE FUTURE OF VOLITIONAL SCIENCE

Extrapolations from physics into the social domain are always hazardous but the analogy between the individualistic model of human social behavior and Planck’s quantum oscillator regarding electromagnetic radiative emission is enticing. For example, among all the “degrees of freedom” possessed by the quantum, the particular one that will be expressed in actuality (like a particular color of photonic light) will always satisfy the Principle of Least Action. That is all that can be inferred about the “intent” of the quantum. Likewise, at any given time, the human individual will express the particular one of his many possible options for action that fits into a least-action paradigm. Such a choice has been termed “the pursuit of happiness,” a characterization that offers no insight whatsoever into the nature of the specific intent behind it.

An interesting question is how Galambos’ “integrity of property principle” might be related to the principle of least action. If such a relationship can be established, it deserves to be called “Galambos’ Law” and that property of volitional beings now known as “Property” might be named the “galambosian” or some other term to distinguish it from the properties of volitional humanity in general. This practice would be consistent with the practices of physics, which regard mass, momentum, charge, position, etc. as distinguishable properties of the quantum. But it is the specific property known as the “Hamiltonian” that provides the greatest utility in ascertaining which of all possible courses of physical action is the most likely.¹¹ The Hamiltonian is formulated in terms of “action,” not energy. In nature, action is minimized. Likewise, energy is conserved.

THE QUESTION OF JUSTICE

Forensic science has developed considerable confidence in the means for establishing responsibility for consequences on the basis of physical evidence. However, this profession can do little to prove intent. Thus, for any dispute adjudication to have a peaceful if not amicable outcome — an ideal of a “free society” — it cannot rely on retaliation based on a presumption of intent to injure. The beauty of Galambos (or possibly Estes’) restitution theory of justice is that it depends only on establishing responsibility regardless of the nature of the intent (if any) of those whose actions are connected with an injury to another. Also, only comparative responsibility is relevant since there is always a question of contributory negligence to consider. A theory of damages is yet another matter.

Few would argue that a person accused of causing injury to others is entitled to be judged solely on the facts of the consequences of his acts. From such an individualistic standpoint, a question of guilt or innocence must be resolved on the basis of the degree of responsibility for consequences, which can be measured, not the magnitude of intent to injure, which cannot. Thus it appears, after all, that there is some merit to the so-called “presumption of innocence” principle and none whatsoever for punitive damages. Consequently, the question of moral turpitude is irrelevant to restitution. Yet, according to Galambos, restitution is the criterion of justice. Curiously then, justice need not invoke moral considerations.

Since judicial processes cannot rely on a factual determination of guilt of malicious intent, punitive damages awarded in the course of so-called civil cases and fines and other punishments imposed in so-called felony matters are clearly arbitrary exactions from the accused. The operation of the “peoples” court in rendering such opinions to effect a sanction of enforcement inevitably spreads the responsibility for the damages, actual or potential, to “the public” whereby the conflict is not so much resolved as it is diluted. This is true whether the opinion is rendered by a jury collectively practicing one form of nose-counting or another (as if a majority vote could substitute for observational truth) or by a wise and learned officer of the court acting in good conscience.

Punishment for “sin” is not a human province. Behavior that is at odds with nature receives condign punishment in nature in due course without the benefit of human intervention. Vindication of the “right” by human resort to retribution after the fact of injury constitutes an initiative act of force based on synthetic or superhuman authority. Science offers no prospect of elevating mere human beings to such an authoritarian status by any means whatsoever.

This is not to say that there is no such thing as intent to injure, or that when humans commit injurious acts against their fellows it means nothing more than when the other animals do. In fact, as pointed out by Grannis, intent is inherent in the volitional phenomenon as indicated by the etymology of the word.  Thus,¹² “intent,” whatever it is, must be considered a universal mental factor underlying all voluntary human action. It is just that one can never KNOW “intent” with enough confidence to justify retaliation tit for tat — an eye for an eye, etc. Restitution promotes rationality whereas retaliation and retribution promote only victimhood and enmity.

This position may appear naive in consideration of historical practices and what we generally refer to as a “right” (i.e. a legitimate authority) to react forcefully in self-defense against aggression. Self-preservation is inherent in all living organisms and there is no doubt a strong psychological attachment among humans to the IDEA of being vindicated “right” (i.e. morally righteous) and punishing “wrongdoing.” This drive suggests it may be important to distinguish between what is truly human from what is commonly animal. That was the idea behind Spencer Heath’s proposal to distinguish “society” as a certain peaceful, reciprocal and productive population within the human population at large.¹³ Galambos’“moral island” and “spaceland” metaphors might also be fitted into this paradigm.

So here’s where we need to refine our definition of volition or humanity so that we can know when we are dealing with animal behavior generally and human behavior specifically. This is a problem because we humans have a dual nature. We are switch hitters. We can all revert to our animal origins under certain circumstances. Sex and politics are cases in point. So are street brawls, gun fights, fisticuffs and contact sports.

DIFFERENTIATING SCIENCE FROM IDEOLOGY

An authentic science of volition should be able to shed light on when it is appropriate for humans to behave in accordance with their animal or social natures, and what are the specific circumstances that apply in either case. Also, the science should be able to predict the consequences free of any preconceived moral coloration.

Distinguishing science from ideology is a matter of differentiating between critical study and impassioned belief. How we study a part of the world is both complemented and impaired by how we believe the world to be. This challenge to intellectual honesty was well put recently by a couple of biology-oriented computer scientists:

There is a distinct difference between choosing a particular point of view for exploring a problem and insisting that a particular viewpoint is the only correct description. There may even be good methodological reasons to argue for caricature in a given instance. One of the things that frustrates non-scientists about the practitioners of science is their willing but fickle embrace of caricature. This methodological stance — simplify until forced to do something else — is generally justified by pointing to the productivity of a given simplification: it generates testable hypotheses….. [to which] we can add nuance by including ever more constraints and connections…. thus placing epicycles on epicycles. In this direction lies a top-heavy and unworkable theory. So we return to a simpleton version…. which can provide a [testable] hypothesis generating machine, not just a story-rationalizing machine.¹⁴

I offer these views merely to suggest that there are still other dimensions to be accounted for in what Galambos has referred to as “spaceland.” Perhaps it would be useful to think of “flatland” as the critter world and to “spaceland” as the human domain. I don’t think Abbott would take offense at this characterization.¹⁵ However, this application of Abbott’s imagery might well be inconsistent with what Galambos had in mind.

What is “capitalism?” Galambos considered it an ideology. It must be. After all, the word ends with “-ism.” Linguistics aside, capitalism can also be seen as a social or economic technology. How should that concept be named? Capitalogy? 

According to one knowledgeable observer:

Capitalism produces wealth; it makes people richer than any other system. Capitalism we define as merely a state of nature…where people are free to go about their business based on customary, consensual rules in an evolved, vernacular market system. The more you tamper with it, the less well it works.¹⁶

CLOSURE

There is no disrespect in recognizing that Galambos left unfinished business. Perhaps he was keeping some things he knew to himself and overlooked a few things we now find important. In any event, it is safe to say that the development of volitional science will never be “finished.”

After all, Galambos was only human and it does him no credit to treat him otherwise. This is a good time of year (Easter) to be remembering this fact. It is entirely conceivable to me that Jesus might have meant more to the race had he not been deified by his disciples and “churchified” by his adversaries. Richard Nesbit, an early FEI lecturer, once referred to this phenomenon in his presentation of Course 100 as “church-ianity.” Galambos was not amused but Nesbit’s point was clear.

 

END NOTES

1    Cohen, Morris R. and Ernest Nagel, Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method,” Harcourt, Brace &

            Co., 1934.

2    Joseph A. Galambos, “Why Does a Company Which Practices and Promotes Capitalism Call Itself

             LIBERAL?” THRUST FOR FREEDOM–NO. 1, Los Angeles: The Liberal Publishing Co., 1962.

3    Andrew J. Galambos, “Capitalism, The key to Survival,” Course 100, Free Enterprise Institute, Los

            Angeles, 1961.

4    Bastiat, Frederic, Social Fallacies  [Economic  Sophisms],  Patrick James Stirling Translation. Santa

Ana, CA: Register Publishing Co., 1944.

5    Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, 1847.

6    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Science#cite_ref-Thurs_3-0

7    Galambos, Andrew J., “The Theory and Protection of Primary Property,” Free Enterprise Institute

            Course V-201.

8    Eddington, Arthur S. The Philosophy of Physical Science, pp. 16-27. University of Michigan Press,

1958,

9    Bridgman, Percy W., The Nature of Physical Theory, p.5. Princeton University Press, 1936.

10  Galambos, Andrew J., Sic Itur ad Astra. Coronado, CA: Universal Scientific Publishing Co., 1998.

11  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hamiltonian_mechanics

12  Grannis, Larry, “The Lexicon of Volition, ”E-mail L8, Saturday, 18 April, 1998, 01:40:21 -0700.

13  Heath, Spencer, Citadel, Market and Altar–Emerging Society. Elkridge, MD: Science of Society

             Foundation, 1957. (Heather Foundation, Spencer Heath MacCallum, Intellectual Estate Trustee,                        sm@look.net; 713 W. Spruce St., Deming, NM 88030.)

14  Ahouse, Jeremy C. and Robert C. Berwick, “Darwin on the Mind — Evolutionary Psychology is in      Fashion but is any of it True,” an essay review of Steven Pinker, How the Mind Works (W.W.    Norton, 1998), p. 36, Boston Review, April/May, 1998.

15  Abbott, Edwin A., Flatland — A Romance of Many Dimensions. Sixth Edition. Oxford: Basil Blackwell,

1950.

16  Bonner, Bill, “Capitalism and the American Way,” The Daily Reckoning, London, England, Monday,

             February 4, 2008.

 

_______________________________________________________________

Spencer Heath Archive

Item 3077

September 18, 2014

 

 

 

GOVERNMENT AS A MARKETABLE SERVICE

Some Recent History in the

Propagation of this Idea

 

Alvin Lowi, Jr.[i]

September 18, 2014

 

The announcement of a MISES CIRCLE seminar, “Society Without a State: Law and Order in a Free World,” to be held on November 8, 2014 has stirred much interest in the “total alternative” to tax-funded government, to use F. A. (“Baldy”) Harper’s phrase. Sixty years ago, about 1955, Baldy counted on the fingers of one hand the people he knew of in the world besides himself who entertained the idea.[ii] Today probably there are tens of thousands. Yet the history of the idea’s inception and spread, where known at all, is clouded. I met Spencer Heath in 1961 through Andrew J. Galambos,[iii] and because I was associated with Galambos’ Free Enterprise Institute, I was privileged to witness and participate in one of the least known parts of that spread, which it is the purpose of this essay to record.

 

Mises Daily on March 25, 2006 republished J. Huston McCulloch’s 1977 translation of a remarkable 1849 essay in French entitled The Production of Security. The author of this essay was an obscure laissez faire economist from Belgium named Gustave de Molinari, a contemporary and intellectual kinsman of the better known French liberal political economist Frederic Bastiat. McCulloch’s relatively recent English translation includes an inspiring introduction by Murray Rothbard. [iv]

 

Gustave de Molinari (1819 – 1912) was born in Belgium and educated there in the new academic field of economics. He was associated with the French “économistes”, a group of laissez-faire liberals recognizable nowadays as pro-capitalist libertarians. Throughout his long life (he was 92 when he died), Molinari argued for peace, free trade, freedom of speech, freedom of association, and liberty in all its forms.

 

Molinari was unique among economists in his conviction that the economy did not need even constitutionally limited government protection. He was apparently the first intellectual to discover this possibility and advance a theory of society entirely devoid of political regimentation, i.e. a stateless society. His vision of a stable and humane social paradigm takes individual human liberty to the limit. It is a condition libertarians nowadays call individualist anarchy, market anarchism, or anarcho-capitalism. Society without political statecraft has also been variously referred to as economic government, voluntary government, or government via market-delivered property protection services.

 

Andrew J. Galambos came to think likewise a century later, and apparently without a prompt from Molinari. Galambos was an astronomer and astrophysicist who left the government-dominated defense industry in 1959 at the height of the Cold War to make the world safe for astronauts. While still a tenured professor in physics he launched his campaign, “Capitalism, The Key to Survival,” in 1960 as a profit-seeking education business in Los Angeles under the banner of The Free Enterprise Institute (FEI). Galambos was an enthusiastic promoter of the writings of Rothbard and Mises. In the early 1960s, he brought Mises, LeFevre, MacCallum, and F.A. Harper to Southern California for seminars. He died in 1997 after a long illness. Some of his taped lectures were transcribed and published in 1999 as Sic Itur ad Astra, http://www.amazon.com/Sic-Itur-Ad-Astra-Volition/dp/0880780045/sr=1-2/qid=1160671190/ref=pd_bbs_2/102-3770766-9772913?ie=UTF8&s=books

 

It is curious that at the time of McCulloch’s translation, Galambos and Rothbard, who were ideologically and intellectually congenial in most respects, are seen to be going in opposite ideological directions, opposite in terms of Molinari’s “two ways of considering society.” Molinari put legislation and society (force and voluntary exchange) in separate worlds where they belong. But by the time McCulloch’s translation of Molinari’s Production of Security essay appeared (New York: Center for Libertarian Studies, 1977), Rothbard had already turned toward politics for social salvation. He was influential in the formation of the Libertarian Party in 1973[v]. Had Rothbard taken Molinari’s advice to heart, he would not have taken this direction. Partisan politics was not recommended by Molinari. In fact, such a course of action was contrary to his vision of the future.

 

While Rothbard and his libertarian colleagues were preoccupied with their political project, Galambos in Southern California was building ideological momentum for his non-political “natural republic,” which he envisioned as a societal condition comprised of voluntary behavior based on economic and ethical knowledge developed via an authentic science of society (dubbed “Volitional Science”). It would evolve through the market process, gradually replacing all coercive political institutions with voluntary, entrepreneurially-delivered property protection services.

 

At the outset of his venture, Galambos had been obsessed with American constitutionalism, which represented to him the break with traditional political despotism that enabled the liberation and growth of humanity as exemplified in what Alexis de Tocqueville and others considered “the American phenomenon.”[vi] Galambos had approached constitutionalism as an intellectual game to be played with organizational structures to contrive political strategies for limiting the scope of monopoly political government in keeping with the sentiments of the Declaration of Independence and other classical liberal arguments. However, no matter how liberal, creative or ingenious were these social contrivances of grand human design, they were inevitably political and therefore authoritarian and collectivistic, an implication not lost on Galambos’ students. Curiously, it was such implications in Ayn Rand’s “Objectivism” and Leonard Read’s “libertarian limited government” that alienated Galambos from those largely compatible social movements. Galambos defended his approach to constitutional political government with the claim that scientific method could be relied upon to avert the usual outcomes from political administration. Separation of economy and state was a central feature. The physicist cum economist would see to it.

 

Galambos’ teachings of laissez faire led to the inescapable conclusion that stable and progressive social institutions originated in voluntary human behavior and free association giving rise to autonomous specialization and exchange. Accordingly, whatever governmental institutions would come about would be by market demand subject to the spontaneous natural social order. Thus arose the contradiction presented by subsuming a free society under traditional American constitutionalism.

 

Reading the history and content of Molinari’s essay recalls the debates that occurred among the students of Galambos in the early days of the Free Enterprise Institute. Logical extrapolations of Galambos’ earliest teachings had begun to reveal inconsistencies in the classical liberal treatment of society that called for a modicum of political government to maintain a legal framework of order based on private property protection. Such protection was presumed to require an authority that was superior to the market, i.e. a supernatural authority. “The Constitution” has symbolized this supernatural authority in America.

 

About this time, 1963, Robert LeFevre came onto the Free Enterprise Institute scene. His arguments reduced all political proceedings to absurdity.[vii] They were being heard and brought back into the discussions at FEI by some of Galambos students attending LeFevre’s lectures at the Freedom School in Colorado.

 

Galambos conceived government as nothing more than the collection of services devoted to the protection of private property. It should not have been such a huge leap of faith, therefore, to dump the political paradigm altogether in favor of property protection services rendered volitionally for profit in the marketplace by competitive private enterprise. Yet, Galambos was not the first to leap. The idea began to catch on first among his students. The initial awakening took place soon after the first offering of his Course 100 in 1961 in which he sanctioned limited political government. I reckon the sequence of discoveries occurred thereafter as follows.

 

Anthropologist Spencer Heath MacCallum gave a guest course for FEI in 1963 in which he introduced the idea of a proprietary community.[viii]^,[ix] His approach followed the work of his grandfather Spencer Heath, who would have presented the concept to Galambos’ students a year earlier but for the intervention of a health crisis that ended his long life. Later, MacCallum also introduced E.C. Riegel’s The New Approach to Freedom to the FEI market, which suggested that laissez faire competition in the marketplace is necessary and sufficient government.[x] Riegel’s concept of “private enterprise money” was another inspiration MacCallum brought into the discussion of a wholly voluntary society.[xi]

 

In his FEI guest lectures the same year, F.A. Harper introduced Molinari’s vision of unregimented society to Galambos’ market.[xii] He was able to offer the attendees of his seminar some rare copies of Molinari’s only book in English at the time entitled Society of Tomorrow.[xiii] Harper billed Molinari’s proposal as a “total alternative” to the status quo — an emergent “grand alternative” to political government.

 

Out of this general inquiry came various private enterprise extrapolations. First to my knowledge was the “the insurance industry is government” proposal of physicist-mathematician and FEI contractor Piet Bos.[xiv] Next came a vision of competing companies providing dispute resolution, patrol, security technology, and bounty hunting services for fee or subscription as proposed by electrical engineer/entrepreneur/FEI contractor Charles R. Estes. Estes also proposed various private enterprise money and property restitution ventures.[xv] Subsequently, Andrew Galambos came out with his Course V201 containing his concept of the pure contractual corporation operating a clearinghouse for businesses utilizing intellectual property for profit. Galambos claimed this business would dispense with political government forever. Finally, Robert Klassen, another FEI contractor, published his treatise Economic Government.[xvi] 

 

In 1964, some FEI contractors teamed up with FEI to bring Robert LeFevre to Los Angeles to give his seminar.[xvii] By this time, many of Galambos’ students had already shunned political government even as a transient lesser evil, preferring to take their chances with self-government in the marketplace, and eventually Galambos himself abandoned all political artifice. By 1968, he was espousing pure free-market social organization in which government was defined as follows:

 

“A government is a person or an organization that offers for sale products or services designed to protect property, to which the owner of that property may voluntarily subscribe.” [xviii]

 

Galambos called attention to his use of the article “a” in this definition: “a” government, not “the” government, emphasizing the absence of monopoly as an essential attribute.

 

The Mises Institute web page editor refers to Molinari’s vision as “anarcho-capitalism.” This libertarian term of art is an unfortunate choice, since it suggests Molinari’s brand of capitalism is without rules of order. It also misleads the reader by implying that Molinari’s proposal has some sort of political significance, at least an anti-state argument. Not so. Molinari is among the select few to abstain from any political contentions and pretensions whatsoever. 

 

Galambos’ intellectual descendent Klassen used the term “economic government” to characterize the voluntary alternative in government affairs. Klassen’s term is more descriptive of Molinari’s positive prospect of security as a product of private enterprise operating in a wholly voluntary environment. This term is actually more to the point of Molinari’s proposal than his own title Production of Security, since “economic government” recognizes the important social contribution of proprietary administration in the practical realization and maintenance of a public service in a wholly voluntary society. Molinari, Heath and ultimately Galambos agreed on this point.

 

Molinari says that “There are two ways of considering society.” He explains the “first way” as follows:

 

According to some, the development of human associations is not subject to providential, unchangeable laws. Rather, these associations, having originally been organized in a purely artificial manner by primeval legislators, can later be modified or remade by other legislators, in step with the progress of social science. In this system the government plays a preeminent role, because it is upon it, the custodian of the principle of authority, that the daily task of modifying and remaking society devolves.

 

Initially, Galambos’ approach to society inclined toward Molinari’s “first way,” described above. He continued in this direction even after he became aware of Molinari’s treatise, Society of Tomorrow, which was given to him by his esteemed guest lecturer, F. A. Harper. Galambos was convinced that authentic social science (as he defined it), which came to be known as “volitional science” (named by Jay S. Snelson), would provide the legitimate authority and technology for designing and implementing the mechanisms, organizations and practices for the proper operation of society in the future. He believed his society of the future would be a technological achievement, which would lead to a wholly voluntary society in which every person would have 100% control over his own property, a condition he defined as freedom. Thus he would build a regime he called “the natural republic” (named by me) in a step-by-step process according to a design rendered beforehand, much as an architect would build a skyscraper — an analogy attributed to Galambos’ architect father Joseph B. Galambos.[xix] The contractors of the architect would come to the task by way of an ideological program, one which the architect offered as a proprietary product. Thereby freedom would be “built” or perhaps manufactured as a product by developing property protection and selling it as a product protected by intellectual property defense mechanisms, which Galambos disclosed in his Course V-201, “The Theory and Protection of Primary Property.” 

 

While Molinari also talked about “production of security,” he rejected “social engineering” which Galambos, on the other hand, seemed to embrace in his ideological program. Galambos’ approach after he dispensed with political structures did fit the description of Molinari’s first way of considering society.

 

Galambos emphasized comprehensive property protection as the keystone of human society, and he relied on competitive private enterprise for profit to deliver the service. This idea was consistent with Molinari’s “second” approach, described by him as follows:

 

“According to others, on the contrary, society is a purely natural fact. Like the earth on which it stands, society moves in accordance with general, preexisting laws. In this system, there is no such thing, strictly speaking, as social science; there is only economic science, which studies the natural organism of society and shows how this organism functions.”

 

Notwithstanding Molinari’s rhetorical dismissal of “social science,” his organic view of society is remarkably consistent with Spencer Heath’s “Socionomy.”[xx] Whether Heath ever encountered Molinari’s writings is unknown. But in his treatise, Heath defines his “Socionomy” as follows:[xxi]

 

“Socionomy is the theory or formulation of the organic laws exemplified in the organization and development of society (Webster’s New International Dictionary).”

 

He also defined society as a natural phenomenon consisting of the strictly voluntary interactions of humans, advocating acceptance of it and learning how to get along in it as it is. Heath considered that his “socionomy” qualified as an authentic “natural science of society” because it produced dependable social technologies.

 

Molinari continues his explanation of his second approach as follows:

 

“We propose to examine, within the latter system [“economic science”], the function and natural organization of government – The Natural Order of Society. In order to define and delimit the function of government, it is first necessary to investigate the essence and object of society itself. What natural impulse do men obey when they combine into society? They are obeying the impulse or, to speak more exactly, the instinct of sociability. The human race is essentially sociable. Like beavers and the higher animal species in general, men have an instinctive inclination to live in society.”

 

Here Molinari depicts society as the natural habitat of man. That concept was familiar to students of Galambos according to FEI contractor Eric Szuter, who was inspired to choose it as his dissertation topic for a PhD in “Human Ethology.”

 

Molinari asks: “Why did this instinct [to live in society] come into being?” Galambos would object to such a question on the grounds that “why” questions do not qualify for scientific investigation because they call for theological answers, and he confessed he did not know anyone who could talk to God, the presumed creator of the universe. Galambos insisted that science, reliably informed by what can be gleaned of reality by the senses, can only deal with “how” questions. Thus, he would put Molinari’s question in a scientific context as “How did this instinct develop?” Molinari was quite prepared to answer this question as well, offering a splendid series of observations as follows:

 

“Man experiences a multitude of needs, on whose satisfaction his happiness depends, and whose non-satisfaction entails suffering. Alone and isolated, he could only provide in an incomplete, insufficient manner for these incessant needs. The instinct of sociability brings him together with similar persons, and drives him into communication with them. Therefore, impelled by the self-interest of the individuals thus brought together, a certain division of labor is established, necessarily followed by exchanges. In brief, we see an organization emerge, by means of which man can more completely satisfy his needs than he could living in isolation. This natural organization is called society.”

 

This argument demonstrates that Molinari was able to practice some dignified social science notwithstanding his dismissals of the notion.

 

Late Hayek is consistent with this view,[xxii] and Mises’ economics is consistent as well.[xxiii] But their indulgences in “political economy” are problematical because of the connection with policy, i.e. public policy. Public policy has to do with the governance of the political authority that presumes to reign over society. Mises accepted a “limited” political monopoly (state) control of the means of defense, property protection and justice — by “law” of course. Sadly, however, practical limits to political government are unknown to man. Madison’s heroic attempts in The Federalist Papers to set forth public policies to be embodied in a constitution for a republic of defined and limited powers over the people of the United States of America are a poignant case in point. 

 

The nature of man and his government is a long-studied and little-understood subject in the human curriculum.[xxiv]^{,[xxv],[xxvi]} Molinari was perhaps the first person to make a persuasive case for evolutionary natural social organization, which is the grand alternative to a Platonic political state. Hopefully, with the relatively recent spread of economic knowledge and know-how, it will not take economic government 5000 years to overtake political government of about that age.

 

 

 

/Materials deleted from the foregoing:/

 

[Galambos’ teachings of laissez faire capitalism in the early days of the Free Enterprise Institute had led to the inescapable conclusion that stable and progressive social institutions originate in voluntary human behavior and free association, giving rise to autonomous specialization and exchange between individuals and their proprietary organizations. Accordingly, whatever governmental institutions might come about in the prospective free society would be by market demand subject to the spontaneous natural social order. How to square this natural outcome with his proposed “engineered” free society (called a natural republic), let alone his politically “free” society under limited constitutional government, was a high intellectual challenge. The natural outcome eventually won out on the strength of Ockham’s Razor.]

 

End Notes