Spencer Heath Archive

Item 3090

Rothbard Correspondence – to, from and about Murray N. Rothbard

1956-1961

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Spencer Heath Archive

Item 1583

Letter to Dr. F.A. Harper

November 29, 1956

 

Dear Dr. Harper:

My grandson and I had a very delightful visit with you and Dr. Opitz a week or so ago.

Apropos of eminent scientists making bold adven­tures into fields other than their own, I am sending you a copy of Dr. Erwin Schrödinger’s little book, What is Life?. It may be that, like myself, you may not be able to fathom all of its mathematical minutiae, but if so, I am sure you will still be able to get his drift, which is far the more important. Doubtless, you will note the irony of his “negative entropy,” as if life were the negative of death. “Entropy”, as known to physical science, is, of course, 100 percent negative, so far as life or any other kind of order or organization is con­cerned. But we won’t have to care much which side of the scales he puts his plus or minus signs on, just so he realizes, as he does, that all nature’s dice are loaded in favor of the higher organizational processes and forms, of which the social organization of men in reciprocal relationships is the highest that we know — the only form having spiritual, that is, creative, functions and powers.

I have been quoting Emerson on prohibition for years, and I am sure my version is very nearly exact. But after diligent search, I have failed to locate it. However, I have a friend in Montreal who is a regular hound for just such things as this. I have written her, and I think you will hear from her very soon. Meantime, I will make inquiry from other sources and let you have it just as soon as I can.

The quotation as I remember it is:

“My friend, the prohibitionist, would deprive Scroggs of his beer, and make him feel the poorer for it; but I, for my part, shall not be content with myself until I have so in­spired him that he will give up beer and know himself the richer for it.”

It was kind of you to send us the addresses of the contributors to On Freedom and Free Enterprise.

Many thanks for the Rothbard article on land administration. I am very happy to find that at least one professional economist in good standing has discovered the basic social function of private property in land — the fundamental public service which the landlord actually does perform and for which he receives an automatic, market-measured recompense in the form of ground rent or increment of value. The land-owner, of course, is seeking his own highest recompense, but in doing so, he is none-the-less choosing and allocating to that tenant or purchaser who is able to make it most productive and thus contribute most to the market and the public welfare.

I hope very much that Mr. Rothbard will publicize his discovery and that it may come under considerable public discussion, to the enlightenment of many minds.

My grandson and I are taking a plane tonight to attend the Chicago Conference on “Work in Today’s World” and to have the pleasure of meeting our Spiritual Mobilization friends.

Cordially,

 

 

 

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Spencer Heath Archive

Item 1594

Letter to Paul Poirot,

The Foundation for Economic Education, Irvington-on-Hudson, New York

December 19, 1956

 

 

Dear Mr. Poirot:

It was very nice seeing you at Irvington a week or so ago. It was pleasant to enjoy the intellectual and other hospitality of the Foundation.

I was especially pleased at having received from you by the hand of Dr. Harper the article entitled, “The Single Tax: Its Economic and Moral Principles,” by Murray N. Rothbard.

For a number of years, I have been looking forward to professional economists going into the question of social versus political ownership and administration of sites and other natural resources — God’s gifts to men. I look forward to Dr. Rothbard’s study arousing interest and provoking discussion of Proprietary Admin­istration as the creative alternative to the Number One Plank in the Communist Manifesto of 1848, and other proposals for land “socialization,” or to the same effect. It is only too true, as Dr. Rothbard says, that “Econo­mists have never satisfactorily refuted them.” They have even acceded to the Communist argument so far as land is concerned, while currently they stand mute and let the anti-Communist case go by default.

It is gratifying, therefore, to find in Dr. Rothbard a writer of professional standing who is looking into the matter, who has, in fact, discovered the societal function of non-political property in land: that site owners do in fact perform that basic and most essential of all public services — namely, the automatic, non-political allocation of sites and resources to the use of those who can administer them most productively and who alone can pay the highest rent or price.

Recognition of this undeniable public service per­formed by landlords — and that rent is their market recompense for these public services — sets the social institution of property in land in an entirely new light. It cuts the ground alike from under the supposed Ricardian and Malthusian laws and the supposed moral and reli­gious argument in favor of bureaucratic or governmental in place of proprietary and social, that is, contractual, administration.

Not only this, but it gives clue to the possibility of other authentic services to the sites, other than the mere distribution of them, such as the policing of the sites without molesting the property or otherwise infringing the liberty of the users or inhabitants of them — as policing by political authority necessarily does. Each free-holder would pay for police protection and other public services only in proportion as they affected the value of the site occupied by him, the quan­tum of payment being determined by the competition of the market, as is any other value.

The principle of proprietary instead of political administration of public as well as private community properties and services (such as hotels, professional buildings, shopping centers, etc.) may quite possibly be the key to new advances in the economic and social sciences comparable to those made by physical science since the present century began.

I hope to see Dr. Rothbard’s new venture receive at the hands of his professional associates all the attention and discussion that its great importance deserves.

Sincerely yours,

SH/m

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Spencer Heath Archive

Item 1577

Letter to Dr. Percy L. Greaves,

Christian Freedom Foundation,

26 West 58th Street, New York 19, New York

December 19, 1956

 

 

 

Dear Dr. Greaves:

Here is the little booklet on the organization of real estate that I referred to when we were talking about public services being performed by proprietary organization. You can see from this that my idea of proprietary administration has to do with independent business organizations, formed without any let or license by the war-making institution and having no authority or control over any property but their own, either by way of condemnation or otherwise.

This of course does not include any persons or corporations given a specific monopoly power by the political authority, and, moreover, a monopoly power completely under regulation by the authority that creates it, and subject even to the death penalty when the legis­lative or executive, or the judicial power acting as such, so prescribes.

A corporation so authorized to serve water or power, for instance, is no more a private corporation than is a sheriff who is similarly authorized to serve writs or seize property under direction of the power which appoints and establishes him. The only difference is one of detail, in that the so-called public-service corporation, “affected with a public interest”, usually supplies a lot more capital for the enterprise than the sheriff does (other than his old gray mare or “Model T”). A further differ­ence is in the mode of compensation. To the corporation is assigned a limited portion of the taxing power, where­as the sheriff must worry along on a stipendiary basis in the main,

When, under some “democratic” ideology, the corpora­tion is thrown out, with or without some compensation, and a salaried body of bureaucratic /sic – check original/ put in its place, this arrangement is called “public ownership.” It is, of course, not any less private or any more public than it was in the first place.

We had a nice talk together at luncheon. I hope to see you again before too long. I have had a pleasant telephone visit with Murray Rothbard, and expect to see him in person, along with you, at the von Mises session tomorrow night.

Merry Christmas,

 

 

SH/m

Enc:  “Society & Its Services”

“Notes on the Organization of Real Estate”

 

 

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Spencer Heath Archive

Item 2518

Letter from Murray Rothbard,

215 W. 88^th Street, New York City

January 14, 1957

 

 

Dear Mr. Heath:

 

Thank you for your very nice letter of the 7^th. I’m very sorry that I got tied up that Thursday and the preceding day, and could neither see you nor attend the Mises seminar as I almost always do. I would be most happy to see you this week in New York.

 

     I have long admired your writings on Henry George and on taxation in general. I am looking forward eagerly to the publication of your book.

 

     Best wishes.

Sincerely yours,

 

/S/ Murray N. Rothbard

 

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Item 2541

Carbon of letter to Paul L. Poirot,

Foundation for Economic Education,

Irvington-on-Hudson, New York

March 25, 1957

 

Dear Dr. Poirot:

 

Please accept my belated thanks to you for sending a copy of the Foundation’s new publication as written by Dr. Murray Rothbard.

     I am happy that the Foundation is taking some steps towards clearing up the almost univer­sal lack of understanding with respect to the modern institution of private property in land — its present functioning and its potentiality for the future.

     Thanking you, and with very best wishes,

Sincerely,

 

SH/

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Spencer Heath Archive

Item 1608

Carbon copy of a letter to Leonard E. Read,

Foundation for Economic Education, Irvington-on-Hudson, New York

March 25, 1957

 

 

Dear Mr. Read:

Knowing as you do that I look upon the develop­ment of community-wide real-estate administration as the key to the future advancement of free enterprise in the field of public administration, you will not be surprised at the pleasure I have taken in reading Murray Rothbard’s contribution to your Special Essay Series.

As showing how sound reasoning does eventually prevail,

I enclose copy of a recent letter from one of the longest-time and most hard-bitten Single Taxers I have known. This letter, of course, speaks for itself.

I feel sure that a paper such as Dr. Rothbard’s having the prestige of F.E.E. can have very far-reach­ing effects among the more practical-minded followers of Henry George, some of whom, like Mr. Codman in the real estate business and Mr. Lincoln of the Lincoln Electric Company, are very substantial people in all other respects.

Sincerely,

SH/m

Enc:  cc, Codman to Heath, 2/22

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Spencer Heath Archive

Item 2525

Letter from John S. Codman,

222 Summer Street, Boston,

February 22, 1957

 

Dear Mr. Heath:

I apologize for long delay in acknowledging several documents from you. But weak eyes and hands make it difficult for me to carry on my correspondence as I should. I am especially interested in the pamphlet entitled “Why the Henry George Idea Does Not Prevail.” To this question my answer is much the same as yours and let me register my acceptance of the following sentences:

“That rent instead of taxes is the naturally ordained recompense for Community Services is the very heart and essence of the Georgian ideal.”

 And also the following:

“But his instrument for employing rent in lieu of taxation was taxation itself, the very tool of tyranny.”

 However, your most interesting statement is the following:

“Only the general landowning interest, depending as it does on public values for its recompense, can properly perform the public services. It has none but public services to perform, none but public revenue to receive.”

    I do not quarrel with the above statement, nor do I endorse it but I have been thinking a lot about it and I have tried to envision how it would operate. There are many questions that arise but I cannot ask them now. However, I should like very much to hear from you again if you care to express any further ideas as to practical details.

 

Sincerely yours,

 

/S/ john S. Codman

JSC-D

 

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Spencer Heath Archive

Item 1613

Carbon copy of a letter to John Chamberlain

April 10, 1957

 

 

Dear John:

Anent the need for exposing the widely current fal­lacies of land communism, we do make some progress, even though it be like the speed of a glacier. To wit, my good old friend, John S. Codman, after many years of resistance as a Henry George man, has at last practically capitulated. Years ago, and for a long time, I thought he might be sperate; for he was a very substantial man in many respects, mentally, morally and economically. He went so far as to invite me to present the positive aspect of land adminis­tration to the Real Estate Board in Boston, which I did. But all to no avail so far as he was concerned. So, I have been practically out of communication with him in recent years. His letter of February 22nd, copy of which I en­close, speaks for itself.

Then, there is Murray Rothbard, for a long time and happily a disciple of von Mises, now taking new views with respect to land communism. Murray seems to be heading a small group of von Mises students with similar new ideas. Maybe Rothbard et al are only concerned with the fallacies of land communism, and haven’t caught very much of the function of land ownership as the administration of community services. Nevertheless,

this latter is implicit in their revolt against the old ideas, and progress is being made. This is especially apparent in the fact of Leonard Read taking up Rothbard’s attack on land communism and publicizing it, after being for some years indifferent to my own exposure (and yours) in Progress & Poverty Reviewed.

Also, young Hugh P. King writes that he sent a copy of the new version of “Why the Henry George Idea Does Not Prevail” to his father, Dr. Wilford King, and re­ceived back a very favorable comment on it.

Well, here goes for now; hoping to see you before too long. CM&A is on the press.

Sincerely,

 

Enc:  Rothbard article on Single Tax

Codman letter 2/22/57

“Why the H.G. Idea Does Not Prevail” (revised)

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Spencer Heath Archive

Item 2558

Letter to Murray N. Rothbard,

215 West 88^th Street,

New York 24. New York

April 24, 1957

 

 

Dear Dr. Rothbard:

 

I have just been re-reading with appreciation your article on the Single Tax published by the Foundation for Economic Education.

 

     In this connection, it occurs to me you might be interested in a brief exposition of property in land as it will appear in the Appendix of my Citadel, Market and Altar, to be published June 1^st. So I am sending you one of the page proofs containing this.

 

Cordially,

 

SH/m

Encl.

 

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Spencer Heath Archive

Item 2196

Taping by Spencer MacCallum during discussion at a seminar at the Foundation for Economic Education (FEE), Irvington-on-Hudson, New York, of Heath’s defense of the proposition of the day as presented by Dr. Murray Rothbard

June 23, 1957

 

 

It seems to me we ought to evaluate what is laid before us .. and not knock it down. He probably has some viewpoints with some merits, and anyway, it seems to me that if we have any goods of our own, we ought to praise them to the customer and try to sell them, and not try to unsell somebody else’s goods. There is not much in it for us if we succeed in doing that, which is pretty hard to do anyway. I am glad we have heard from a banker, a real banker. I never called myself a banker, but for a good many years I was part owner of several banks, and I was a depositor in several banks, and I was a substantial borrower in several banks. And for the most part, I want to say that my dealing with banks hasn’t been unsatis­factory. It’s been helpful to my business. But with government all my dealings have resulted in loss.

     But we make a mistake, I think, when we think that we cannot apply democracy to our free enterprise business. If we can’t, our public business is in a bad way. It’s been in a bad way a long time. And I think it’s going to stay in a bad way until we can find some way of conducting our public affairs in some manner similar to the manner in which we conduct, and profitably conduct, our private affairs. Now we have an example of democracy in our free enterprise, a voting democracy, if you will. The ideal of a democracy, you know, is to do things together by consent of all and coercion of none — to do creative things together. Now when a lot of people want to do something creatively, they are likely to pool their resources in some kind of an organization. That often happens; it happens in thousands of things. When we pool our resources in a specific kind of organization, we usually call it a corporation. And in that corporation, we follow our property in proportion to what we have put in. So every part owner has a voting influence, a voting right in that corporation in proportion to what he has con­tributed to the body of the corporation, namely its assets. That is a democracy. And that same democracy does the voting; it elects the staff by the democratic process of electing officers. And the officers conduct the business in a manner reasonably satisfactory to the voting owners of the property. I merely offer that as an indication that you can have a voting democracy in respect to your public affairs as in your private affairs. Just because we have a lot of people who go to the polls and vote for the fellow who kisses the most babies and promises the most pensions, isn’t any guarantee that we can’t have a genuine democracy in private enterprise — which we can have and do have. We had better learn a lesson from life, and not from something that fails — which democracy in government has always done historically. And serving of one another by corporate entities in a cooperative manner democratically administered, as I have just said, is not a unique, strange animal; it is something with which we are fairly familiar, but we somehow haven’t identified it as being democratic.

     Now, we have set up some kind of a government agency, a central bank, and Dr. Rothbard tells us that it is in effect the government, because the government appoints the officers. Very good, then — and appoints them for life. And so the government appoints the officers of the United States Supreme Court, and appoints them for life. Isn’t that a part of the government? I’ll say it is. And so when the government sets up people in charge of a central bank for life, it hasn’t divorced them from the government, it has made them a part of it. To say otherwise is a fallacy, I would say, right there.

     Now, we want a stability in our currency. If we are keeping accounts with one another, suppose all the people in this room were doing things for one another, we would want to have some way to measure what we do. If we couldn’t measure what we did, how would we ever know when we were even? How could we ever balance our accounts? We would get diverse ideas about that. We would think we had received entirely too little from the other fellow, and he would think he had received too little from us, and we couldn’t settle the account. Then we would have to resort to fisticuffs, which is the customary way when you haven’t any rational way, which accountancy is. And accountancy is rational because it shows the ratios between what people do for one another. And you can balance that ratio and make it come out rationally and even. Now we have that balancing system, and to have that we have got to have some kind of a unit. And as Dr. Thurn says, that unit ought to have some stability. Now I’ll tell you where that unit gets its stability. I don’t care whether the unit is a lump of gold, like sort of a nest egg that the hen thinks she has to have before she can lay any more eggs, or whatever it may be. And he sees it the same way; he doesn’t think it has to be a lump of this thing or that or the other, just so there is a unit that is being employed. We are doing business with one another in an exchange system where there is a mar­ket. That unit is operating every day. Never mind whether it has gold or what it has behind it, it is working; because people are voting in this democracy — and here again we have got some democracy, that works. The market is a democratic institution, because it is the great place or institution in which we pool our properties for the purpose of exchanging them, exactly as we pooled our properties in a corporation for the purpose of administering those properties productively — creatively — for other persons. And so, the market, where we pool our properties, there is where we need to vote — and there we do vote. And there, too, we have a property qualification, just exactly as we have a property qualification when we vote in a corporation. So when we voters go to the market and vote, how do we vote? Why I vote everything that I relinquish to the market up as high as I can, and everybody who desires that thing votes it down as low as he can, and the result is that we come to a certain level that we call the current price. Now there is some stability for you. It is the consensus of all the voting people in the voting democracy of the market, voting according to the property qualification which they get automatically in this truly democratic institution called the market. So then we have some stability there, and in consequence of that, we can pass almost any kind, I think without exception, any kind of piece of accountancy, be it a check, token or what not, or coin or check or poker chip or whatever you wanted to call it, so it has figures on it. When in the market my friend does something for me, and I owe him how much, why the market tells me and tells him. And if I write him a token of some kind with that figure that the market says on it, he’ll be satisfied and so will I. If we make any mistake and it doesn’t have the same figures on it as have been voted for in the democracy of the market, neither one of us will be satisfied. We will correct the matter immediately. So in the market, we have a stability of the voting, of the consensus, the kind of calculus of feeling, sentiment, or desires, the autonomous feeling of the society that it needs more of this and less of that and so on, and rates things accordingly so as to keep our civilization alive and well functioning.

 

     Now then, to have that, we must use these tokens of some kind. Dr. Rothbard tells us that if we can get the government out of the token business — writing false tokens — … If I write a token, it has to indicate that I have put something in the market or I don’t get the token; I am going to or will put something in. When government writes a token, it doesn’t pool any properties in our market. On the contrary, it depletes our market, takes out of the market by use of these false tokens, which are nothing in the world but governmentally legalized counterfeiting, which causes us a great deal of trouble because we can’t keep our accounts properly with one another if the numbers are put in there by the “pumping” process, as he calls it, rather than by the service process which we must all use if we want to have any tokens. I haven’t any token to offer any one of you that I didn’t get out of the market because I put something in there. And that’s legitimate; and that’s stable. Now the instability of the market is due to the fact that the govern­ment votes in the market, votes things out of the market without putting anything in. That’s what upsets the whole thing and causes the instability.

     Now I think on this whole thing which is a very compli­cated thing as I am sure all of us who have read Dr. Rothbard’s beautiful little brochure — beautiful little tour de force, I call it — it has given us a beautiful picture of how the thing is working under government domination. Implicitly there, we can see how it might work without government domination, and that is the high value I seem to see in his work. By showing us how badly it works, under government regulation historically from way back, he gives an inti­mation and an implicit suggestion as to how it normally could work. And then he tries to tell us, later on, how we can get rid of some of this incubus of government so the thing can work in the way he has implied — what is the physiology of it in terms of the obverse or reverse of the pathologic which he has been describing to us. I think that is a very helpful thing to do; I am very happy to

follow in that thought. Above all, we want to find out the gold that is in his proposition, sift it out, and avail ourselves of it, value it, and take advantage of it and use it for our intel­lectual and our, I might even say, our artistic enlightenment.

 

     That’s all; I’m all for finding out what Dr. Rothbard has given us, and learning from him. And if anybody else here knows any more about this whole thing than Dr. Rothbard does, I think he ought to have a session. And if Dr. Rothbard knows more about it than we do, right now, and I think he does, I think he ought to have a good session and lay it down on the table and let us use as much of it as we can. And I am sure we can use a lot of it.

 

 

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Spencer Heath Archive

Item 2652

Letter to Heath from Murray N. Rothbard,

215 West 88^th Street, New York 24, New York

July 13, 1957

 

Dear Mr. Heath:

     I wrote the enclosed as the culmination of a lengthy correspondence with Mr. M. S. Lurio, and specifically in reply to his critique of my Single Tax piece, which he read before the annual Henry George conference in Staten Island this week. It also serves as a reply to a Mr. William B. Truehart of Los Angeles, who sent in a longer essay saying substantially the same thing as Mr. Lurio. Apparently the people at FEE thought it worthy of mimeographing, so I am sending a copy on to you. I hope you like it.

 

     All the best.

Sincerely,

 

/s/ Murray N. Rothbard

 

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Spencer Heath Archive

Item 1628

Extract from letter to Dr. Murray N. Rothbard, New York City

July 22, 1957

 

Government — in economics — cannot allocate anything

but special privilege at the common cost and to the general detriment.

 

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Spencer Heath Archive

Item 2976

Review of Heath’s Citadel, Market and Altar

in The Freeman, pp. 63-64.

July 1958

 

For more than two decades, Mr. Spencer Heath has served, unheralded, the cause of freedom in America. Now, with Citadel, Market and Altar, this keen and sprightly octogenarian offers his magnum opus after what has been a virtual lifetime of thought and effort, following his retirement as an eminent aeronautic engineer and patent attorney.

 

     Heath’s most remarkable quality is the striking originality of his thought; for he has carved out an elaborate philosophic system much of which is his own, and he has pushed these ideas on liberty beyond their usual limits to new and exciting frontiers. He is perhaps the first scholar since World War I to advocate the supply of defense and other “public” services by voluntary methods instead of coercive taxation. Not only that. He offers a plan for voluntary finance of defense which is unique and which never occurred to the eminent nineteenth century sponsors of “voluntaryism.”

 

     Heath arrived at his plan in the process of emerging from the Georgist movement, of which he was a prominent member. The Henry Georgists believed that all “public” services should be financed by a single tax on land (especially urban) rent. Heath, accepting the theory that public services should be paid for by rent, came to ask the question: Why not supplied by private landlords rather than by government? From this question came Heath’s new theory of “proprietary administration:” that all the landlords in a given city should pool their assets into one city-wide corporation which would own all the land and supply public services to the tenants for their rent charges. Taxation and all other trappings of government would then disappear, and the rights of persons and private property would become truly inviolate. The only voting would be through the shareholders’ democracy that prevails in any corporation, with landowners voting in proportion to their shares in the corporate entity.

 

     It is questionable whether the free market, if no longer subject to taxation, would resolve its remaining problems in precisely the manner Mr. Heath proposes. His proposal is, at any rate, a challenging one, and it deserves serious consideration.

 

     There are many other important contributions in this book. Among them is Heath’s conclusive demonstration that landlords perform a highly worthy and important function: that of allocating land sites.

 

     Some of the best nuggets are buried in the appendix. Note Heath’s unsurpassed definition of monopoly:

 

“Monopoly exists when government by its coercive power limits to a particular person or organization, or combination of them, the right to sell particular goods or services, and thereby abrogates the right of any other person or organization to compete . . . Neither bigness nor singleness can be injurious, so far as it results from unforced preferences of purchasers and freedom of competition prevails.”

                                      MURRAY N. ROTHBARD

 

 

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Spencer Heath Archive

Item 3090

Carbon of letter from Heath at 312 Halesworth Street,

Santa Ana, California, to Murray N. Rothbard

August 28, 1961

Dear Murray Rothbard:

     Our good friend, “Baldy,” tells me interesting things about you from time to time, making me wish I could see something of you once in a while instead of getting only scrappy bulletins concerning our field marshall Rothbard on the socio-economic front line.

All the libertarians out here seem to know about you. In a recent letter to Dick Smith, I told him that Ruhl Samples is “giving much attention to the ‘neo-von Misianism’ which, through Murray Rothbard, is looking to the possibility of free enterprise operating in the public field.” Samples is a young libertarian ex-actor and former student of Mises. He has been organizing and conducting large meetings in Los Angeles addressed by Dan Smoot, Dean Manion and other defenders of free enterprise.

My grandson, Spencer MacC&llum, has recently received from the University of Washington his Master’s degree in anthropology. His thesis on Proprietary Community is s compre­hensive treatment of this kind of community organization in the perspective of its past, present and future. I imagine you would be interested in seeing it. There is prospect of it being published in the East. Meanwhile, I think he is planning to send you a copy of his working paper, hoping you might give him the benefit of some comments on it.

Sorry I can’t be with you at the coming Von Mises birthday celebration. Remember me to him.

 

Cordially,

                              

 Spencer Heath